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Enter Through the Gift Shop: 
A Guided Tour of Inside Britain 
 
 
What is – to borrow a phrase from the advertiser’s jargon – the brand image of Britain 
in the world today? John Bull, in his mid-Victorian splendour, does not quite represent 
us on the threshold of Europe’s Common Market. And, in a nuclear age, what does it 
matter now who rules the waves? Napoleon, perhaps, with an outsider’s perspective, 
was nearer to the mark with his “nation of shopkeepers,” for buying and selling remain 
principal British occupations. Behind her counters, beyond her shop windows, stand 
her industries, probably the most persistent formative influence on her national 
character… Britain has moved deliberately into the era of the Welfare State, and is 
becoming – this proves to be no contradiction in terms – an “affluent society.”1 
 
The above listing for a programme broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation’s 
English-language General Overseas Service in 1962, includes within it all of the key elements, 
and a central concept, through which this dissertation seeks to explore the representation of 
national identity in the 1960s by the national broadcaster of Great Britain. As one episode in 
a series that promised global listeners a guided tour of Inside Britain, a brief glimpse is afforded 
us in the pages of London Calling – an ‘Overseas Journal’ or magazine guide akin to the 
domestic Radio Times – of what this story of ‘A Nation on the Move’ projected of the British to 
the world. Britain is defined by its trade and industry, the title suggesting energy and 
progression; the British are conscientious socialists without missing out on prosperity. 
Britishness is no longer synonymous with its colonial past, standing as it does on the cusp – 
the writer believed, at least – of accession to the European Economic Community. Crucially, 
there is an awareness of the British brand, no longer embodied in the brash and jingoistic John 
Bull. Through analysis of the representations made of Britain in BBC external broadcasting, 
the following study examines the process by which the broadcaster constructed a new brand 
for the British that, ‘in a nuclear age’ where these ‘shopkeepers’ were adjusting to a life after 
imperial ‘splendour’, employed national identity in the service of national interests.  
 
 Moving beyond a long debate over propagandism, typically with the Cold War as 
context and the focus on scrutinising the BBC for complicity, a review of the programming 
broadcast by the BBC in the sixties shows a more insightful model for interpreting its activities. 
This can be found in the practice of modern ‘nation branding’, parsing the components of a 
country’s identity into its ‘unique selling points’ and then packaging these into a pitch for the 
 
1 British Broadcasting Corporation, London Calling, Vol.2, No.245 (8 February 1962) p.1. 
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global marketplace – the core concept explored in chapter one. It is a speculative exercise 
designed to accumulate esteem, appreciation and awareness of the brand supporting national 
performance in all exchanges. Thus, this study builds on newer investigations into ‘the cultural 
dimension of international relations’, most prominently that of Marie Gillespie, considering the 
role of the media in ‘soft power’.2 It is an assessment of the end product and its influence on 
how identity was understood by an audience, the creation of cultural capital, rather than simply 
the process behind production from a ‘top-down’ perspective, occupied as that has been with 
individuals and institutional relations with political and diplomatic powers.3 How the BBC 
answered in programming the pressing questions asked of Britain in this era – as a great 
power; as head of the Commonwealth; as part and partner of Europe – is illustrative of the 
role it played – of its own accord or in accordance with directive – in presenting a brand that 
supported national need. Rather than simply ‘public diplomacy’ – to ‘speak peace unto nation’ 
and forge direct conversation with foreign publics – ideas about Britain were seeded to 
cultivate a ‘competitive identity’. Nation branding has been criticised for ‘turning bases of 
national recognition into essentialized and homogenized commodity goods’, diversity a 
‘fantasy’ in depictions that are only interested in it as a ‘currency’, ultimately concerned with 
making identity fit ‘patterns of consumption’.4 But all identity is ‘montage’, to paraphrase Peter 
Leese.5 How the BBC compiled those images, what was cut out and to what benefit, is our 
question. 
 
 The source for this analysis is London Calling, a magazine dispatched to subscribers 
wherever in the world they listened to the BBC’s General Overseas Service, or World Service 
as of May 1965. This listings guide came in three volumes during the period 1960-1970, 
changing from a weekly to a more pictorial monthly edition in April 1963; and a fresh volume 
came into being in May 1969, when the formerly separate English-language African Service 
and BBC Europe were consumed within ‘an integrated network of programmes … planned 
and presented as the BBC World Service.’6 As for what the reader or researcher finds within 
these volumes, the content and its constraints are explained in the 200th edition of the second 
volume; that due to the guide being prepared ‘not seven days but several weeks ahead of the 
programmes it covers’, attention is on ‘trends’ rather than ‘week-by-week developments’ and 
 
2 Marie Gillespie , Alban Webb & Gerd Baumann, ‘Broadcasting, strategic challenges and the ecology 
of overseas broadcasting by the BBC’ in Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 28, No. 
4 (2008) pp.453-458. 
3 Thomas Hajkowski, The BBC and National Identity in Britain, 1922-53 (Manchester University Press, 
2017) p.9. 
4 Melissa Aronczyk, Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity (Oxford University 
Press, 2011) pp.8-9, 31. 
5 Peter Leese, Britain Since 1945: Aspects of Identity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) pp.1-
2. 
6 British Broadcasting Corporation, London Calling, Vol.3, No.73 (April 1963) p.2. 
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‘neither news nor topical commentary can ever be previewed.’7 Such a limitation is to be 
expected of any journal sent in advance of the affairs that will be current in the period it covers. 
But this study is concerned with scrutinising those ‘trends’, seeing how patterns in 
programming established aspects of identity that correlated with interests, informing a brand. 
It is a vast resource, touched upon by Emma Robertson in her study of Britishness as 
espoused by the BBC vis-à-vis its Empire, which this dissertation shall survey in its 
‘bewildering array’ in order to gain more detailed insight into the projection of Britain.8 Before 
this analysis, part two of our study, we will examine the necessary concepts and relevant 
literature in the first three chapters: how and why the BBC broadcasted and the model 
provided us by nation branding; national interest in its historical context; national identity and 
the BBC’s role in Britishness. 
  
 
7 London Calling, Vol.2, No.200 (30 March 1961) p.1. 
8 Emma Robertson, “I get a real kick out of Big Ben’: BBC Versions of Britishness on the Empire and 
General Overseas Service, 1932–1948’ in Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 28, 




Nation Branding from Stephen Tallents to Simon Anholt 
 
Nation branding, the application of corporate marketing concepts to countries in order to 
manage their reputation and build recognition of a desired image, offers an understanding as 
to how the BBC, especially in foreign broadcasting, fulfilled its public service in the national 
interest. This first chapter will set out the concept of ‘nation branding’, popularly associated 
with Simon Anholt, a communications and policy advisor to Britain and others, and the model 
it offers – cutting through the debate over whether ‘projection’ equates to ‘propaganda’. The 
project of nation branding is to identify and articulate the identity of a nation state, its peoples 
and places, best located for what the London School of Economics’ Leslie Sklair calls a 
‘lucrative role’ in the globalised world.9 Another of its purposes is the preservation of national 
identity itself, premised on that sense of belonging being boiled – if not broken – down in an 
integrated world system; one in which ‘borders and boundaries appear increasingly 
obsolete.’10 The turn-of-the-century tricks of the marketing trade, extrapolated from that 
profession for public good, are supposed to offer the tools to sustain the nation-state and stake 
its claim in the global marketplace. As we shall see, nation branding is but the latest iteration 
of an ‘art’ whose advocates once called for the ‘projection of England’ or ‘Britain’, usefully 
revised in the language of globalisation. An early bureau for the branding of Britain can, this 
dissertation posits, be found and studied in the BBC of the 1960s. This case will be made first 
by exploring the practice and purpose of nation branding, applying it to what the BBC World 
Service does – and intends to do – before critiquing concepts of ‘propaganda’ that have proved 
so controversial - and controvertible - when discussing the BBC. To this end, four central 
questions will be addressed: why the BBC broadcasts; to whom it broadcasts; by whom it 
broadcasts; which Britain it broadcasts. 
 
In her 2011 book Branding the Nation, communications scholar Melissa Aronczyk collated 
case studies of practitioners trading in what she calls a ‘global business of national identity’. 
Aronczyk details how branding is employed ‘to help the nation-state successfully compete for 
international capital in areas such as tourism, foreign direct investment, import-export trade, 
higher education, and skilled labor.’ There is also a ‘recursive function’, in that positive 
opinions abroad may boomerang back and foster ‘pride and patriotism’ at home. But the 
practice is peaceable, having the ‘professed ability to render the stakes and claims of 
nationalism less antagonistic or chauvinistic than its previous incarnations.’11 The trick, 
 
9 Aronczyk, Branding the Nation, p.22. 
10 Ibid., pp.2-3. 
11 Ibid., pp.16-17. 
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evidently grasped by the BBC in its output, is the marrying of ‘heritage and modernization, 
domestic and foreign concerns, and market and moral ideologies’ into a benign nationalism, 
based on commercial interests rather than politicised passions. It places nationalism within 
internationalism. Identity becomes a crucial element in the interplay of this ‘global nationalism’, 
as Aroncyk understands it, categorising peoples and places for ‘capital attraction’; making 
people and place more ‘cohesive or collegial’ is a collateral effect. Nations become the matrix 
in which economic growth ‘as the engine of citizens’ well-being’ occurs.12 National identities 
and nationalisms can coexist, compete and, in the creative tension of their plurality, profit from 
a stable and stratified system. 
 
As a leading purveyor of ‘branding’ in the context of nations, Simon Anholt, provides a stark 
demonstration of the importance of identity in a global order. Peace and sovereignty may 
prevail – the ‘Pax Americana’ – but it is no less combative on the battlegrounds found away 
from physical borders. To adapt a phrase, you can take the people out of a place but you can’t 
take that place out of those people; however much one does or does not identify with, or 
believe that they belong to a nation, they will be stereotyped for having come from it. If that 
place is reputed as ‘poor, uncultured, backward, dangerous or corrupt’, its people will find 
business ‘outside their own neighbourhood is harder’: ‘consumers in Europe or America will 
willingly pay more for an unknown “Japanese” product than for an identical “Korean” product 
that is probably made in the same Chinese factory.’13 This is also known as the country-of-
origin or made-in effect. It is a fight for a fair assessment on foreign soil, where physical force 
doesn’t much help in changing dispositions. Anholt instructs governments to do three things: 
‘monitor their international image’ with reference to how it affects national interests; collaborate 
across society on a ‘story’, one ‘which honestly reflects the skills, the genius and the will of the 
people’; support ‘innovative and eye-catching products, services, policies and initiatives in 
every sector’ that show the veracity of the national ‘narrative’.14 The BBC can be said to have 
fulfilled all three of these roles: monitoring, story-building, promotion.  
 
Relevant to Britain and its postwar experience of reduced reach and relegation from the top 
league of power, the consolation of ‘branding’ is that there is opportunity through globalism for 
smaller states to find a ‘profitable niche’. In lieu of ‘hard power’, or the raw strength of military 
and economic clout, nations can compete through the ‘soft power’ drawn from turning the raw 
materials of place and people into an alloy -- one that can only be mined from and made in 
their given nation. This ‘competitive identity’ is key to nation branding, whereby states utilise 
 
12 Ibid., p.22. 
13 Simon Anholt, Places: Identity, Image and Reputation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) p.4. 
14 Anholt, Places, pp.6-7. 
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‘attraction if they cannot exercise compulsion’, making resources of ‘their culture, their history, 
their land, their traditions, their genius and their imagination.’15 Britain has historic and recent 
form in this line of not-so-modern manufacture. The Olympic campaign and its ceremonies 
were in effect the realisation of an image overhaul of Britain™, to borrow the title of a 1997 
pamphlet by think-tank Demos, underway since the ‘Cool Britannia’ phase of the mid-1990s.16 
Demos had advised that a new Britain must be thought out and trademarked, as if a corporate 
entity in need of a corporate identity, complete with a slogan to sum it up: ‘Creative Island’ 
trumped others suggested, such as ‘Hub UK - Britain as the world’s crossroads’, and ‘United 
colours of Britain’. In the 1960s too, much commercial use was made of the fact that the 
iconography of Britain, chiefly the Union Jack, no longer had the connotation of ‘an arrogant, 
domineering bully, the land of screw merchants, missionaries, gunboats and dreadnoughts.’17 
Aronczyk punctures the ‘origin narratives’ that ascribe authorship of apparently new-fangled 
fields and their evolution.18 Places and people becoming ‘marketable and monetizable entities’ 
is evident in the free-flowing aftermath of 1945, and the fin de siècle world fairs of European 
empires – continuing the work of ‘international classification’ by the Victorian Great Exhibition 
– that form branding’s ‘prehistory’.19 
 
Thus Anholt’s concept of nation branding is not only applicable to the turn of our century, but 
becomes an updated and better articulated model for past activities and their actors – if far 
less concerted or conscious in their execution than an Olympic ceremony. Illustrative of this, 
and very informative for our purposes, is one predecessor of Anholt found in Sir Stephen 
Tallents. In his 1932 book, The Projection of England, Tallents recognised the need in ‘another 
new world, less tangible but not less significant’ – redrawn rather by globalisation than through 
a discovery of some landmass, though hitherto equally unknown – to command ‘national 
personality’ through the ‘art of national projection’. Least of all England could afford to resign 
its image to the caricature and graffiti of others. To do this the nation must stop ‘waiting, 
passively and perplexedly, for the sun to come out and restore her shadow’ and make good 
its ‘opportunity of establishing a supremacy’ in speaking both ‘peace unto nation’ – to use the 
BBC motto – and its personality. British identity would be dressed in its Sunday best and 
pitched for posterity to this ‘new world’, no longer Britain’s playground, in service of the national 
 
15 Ibid., p.37. 
16 Mark Leonard, Britain™: Renewing our identity (London: Demos, 1997) accessed via 
https://www.demos.co.uk/files/britaintm.pdf  
17 Dominic Sandbrook, The Great British Dream Factory: A Strange History of Our National 
Imagination (London: Penguin Books, 2016) pp.62-3. 
18 Aronczyk, Branding the Nation, p.27. 
19 Ibid., pp.3-4. 
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interest.20 The publishing of Tallents’ plea was, for propaganda historian Philip M. Taylor, ‘the 
focal point in the campaign for increased national propaganda overseas’.21  
 
This ‘art’ which Tallents agitated for in his pamphlet could not properly be applied through the 
Empire Marketing Board, which he directed as Secretary from 1926 until 1933, given its insular 
remit of promoting imperial trade among the ‘British’ world. The BBC was a reliable receptacle 
of EMB material, although producers – such as those of Housewives’ News – could be 
reprimanded for blindly trumpeting Tallents’ campaigns.22 His ideas were, however, carried 
forward into roles at the BBC, first as Controller of Public Relations between 1935-40 and, 
crucially, albeit briefly, the Overseas Service during wartime.23 The World Service was in many 
ways the perfect instrument, an institution that was best placed to achieve Tallents’ ambition, 
although his influence can only be traced as part of the hive mind behind any such grand 
decision. At the EMB, Tallents presided over the Board’s move away from a creed of 
constructive imperialism toward the ideal of a consensual, collaborative Commonwealth. As a 
liberal technocrat, he was ‘convinced both that the sun was most assuredly setting on the 
Empire and that international economic, technical and scientific interdependence was 
accelerating.’24 What Tallents imagined Englishness (synonymous to him in his time with 
Britishness) as being, and the benefits so envisioned, are familiar both to nation branding and 
the BBC’s exploits producing and presenting a pre-Demos ‘Britain™’. If cultivating favour is in 
the interest of the nation, then its identity must be cultured to best propagate among its market. 
For Tallents that meant:  
 
In international affairs – a reputation for disinterestedness. In national affairs – 
a tradition of justice, law and order. In national character – a reputation for 
coolness. In commerce – a reputation for fair dealing. In manufacture – a 
reputation for quality… In sport – a reputation for fair play.25 
 
All of these reputed aspects of Britishness were as much reflections of what sold well in the 
outside world as rooted in reality, and they are repeated as tenets of the brand by the BBC.  
 
20 Stephen Tallents, The Projection of England, in ‘Appendix’ of Scott Anthony, Public Relations and 
the Making of Modern Britain: Stephen Tallents and the Birth of a Progressive Media Profession 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012) pp.209-10. 
21 Philip M. Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British overseas publicity and propaganda 1919-1939 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p.110. 
22 Hajkowski, The BBC and National Identity in Britain, 1922-53, p.24. 
23 See Stephen Constantine, ‘Tallents, Sir Stephen George (1884–1958)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography. Accessed 1 May 2019, from https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/36412  
24 Tallents, Projection of England, in Anthony, Public Relations and the Making of Modern Britain, 
p.29. 




 In a way that could easily be misquoted as from a manual for the nation-brander such 
as Anholt’s, or the appraisals of later BBC executives when defending or demanding state 
funding, Tallents would recruit ‘every channel of communication open to us’ to provide the 
‘background’ necessary for national actors to succeed. This is effectively the building and 
constant maintenance of a brand under whose name, backed by consumer confidence, people 
and products compete for custom on behalf of Britain. In order to compete, of course, the 
identity - be it of brand or nation - must be distinctive and recognisable; to be competitive, 
‘industrial ability’ must be shown to meet ‘industrial ambition’. So too, ‘background’ must make 
a good account of other business vital to the exchequer: ‘They come for pleasure, they come 
for business and they come for learning.’26 And it wasn’t merely a case of facilitating the flow 
of commerce; prophetic again of times to come, freedom of manoeuvre in other spheres 
depended on opinion rather than privilege:  
 
The English people must be seen for what it is – a great nation still anxious to 
serve the world and to secure the world’s peace… English science … an 
instrument of profound importance to the health and happiness of remote 
millions of people. England herself … one of the most beautiful, historic and 
friendly of the world’s countrysides.27 
 
While still a great power in a world that remained predominantly imperial red, but no doubt 
cognisant from suffering the repercussions of the Great Depression that it was not sheltered 
from its profound interdependence, Britain was not an island. Even an almighty empire without 
peer required an accord, or at least an entente cordiale, and thus it was important too to 
provide some foreground for its plans and actions in the world. 
 
BBC World Service: why broadcast? 
 
In the very same year in which Sir Stephen Tallents published his plea for projection of the 
nation, the BBC made its first venture into external broadcasting. The Empire Service of 1932, 
however, began life modelled more on the EMB than as a global bureau for projecting Britain. 
It was in the throes of war and the fallout following it that the virtues of a broader remit were 
realised. What was not certain was whether that remit would involve ‘projection’ or 
‘propaganda’, insofar as the former differs from the subversive exercises of the latter. After 
 
26 Ibid., pp.214-15. 
27 Ibid., pp.228-29. 
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serving as United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1979 to 
1982, Sir Anthony Parsons bemoaned even then that Britain could not see how ‘dazzlingly 
obvious’ were the benefits of sustained projection of the nation. As with any brand, familiarity 
– ‘all other things being equal or nearly equal’ – fosters better outcomes.28 The ‘innocuous’ 
practices for acquiring ‘soft power’, and the ‘nebulous’ nature of it, notes Philip Taylor, hold 
the promise of translating familiarity into ‘appreciation’, even ‘empathy and friendship’.29 For 
Andrew Walker, formerly a World Service journalist and latterly a scholar of it, that promise 
provides a ‘sense of purpose’ to the BBC, where ‘the staff restaurant and club could be part 
of the United Nations’.30 While ‘everybody pats it on the back’, that purpose hasn’t been 
enough to ward off the auditors in periods of austerity. And so the BBC has had to present 
itself as a ‘valuable asset’ for projection to stave off cuts, by showing how it profits Britain™. 
 
 In his study of international broadcasting in 1982, Donald R. Browne found most 
broadcasters in the post-imperial, post-war world ‘to have little understanding of what they 
wish to accomplish or why they wish to accomplish it.’31 He considered that ‘purposeful 
programing’ required working toward ‘objectives’ that many lacked – or lacked interest in – but 
saw that the BBC External Services had been given ‘the impetus to do so’ through the several 
audits overseen by special committees. The resulting reports tended to roll broadcasting in 
with other state information and diplomatic activities, all taken as one in accomplishing their 
strategies. Writing on ‘The Changing Role of British International Propaganda’ in 1971, after 
his retirement from the British Diplomatic Service, Sir Harold Beeley assessed the BBC 
together with the British Council and official Information Service. In totum, these sought to 
explain policy, drive exports – ‘both by directing attention to specific commodities or processes 
and by advertising Britain as a country in the vanguard of technological progress’ – and spread 
the English language.32  The External Services fully participated in this trio of aims, even 
played the key part, since it did indeed have a ‘Role’ in ‘Propaganda’: to borrow a phrase from 
the Crawford Committee of 1925 that had incorporated the BBC, the broadcaster was (and is) 
a ‘trustee for the national interest’.33  
 
 
28 Anthony Parsons, ‘'Vultures and Philistines': British Attitudes to Culture and Cultural Diplomacy’ in 
International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1984-85) p.6. 
29 Philip M. Taylor, Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media Since 1945 (London: 
Routledge, 1997) p.79. 
30 Andrew Walker, A Skyful of Freedom: 60 Years of the BBC World Service (London: Broadside 
Books, 1992) p.114. 
31 Donald R. Browne, International Radio Broadcasting: the limits of the limitless medium (New York: 
Praeger, 1982) p.340. 
32 Harold Beeley, ‘The Changing Role of British International Propaganda’ in The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 398 (1971) p.125. 
33 BBC Handbook 1965 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1965) p.126. 
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 It was because of the spectre of special committees that Sir Beresford Clark, in the 
year of his retirement as Director of External Broadcasting in 1964, argued in the BBC 
Handbook that Britain’s ‘trusted voice’ had ‘to be cultivated, established and, above all, 
preserved.’34 Since the settlement of the External Services with the state by the BBC’s 1947 
Charter, much enlarged in the exigency of a war waged by every means, it had been paid for 
by Foreign Office grant-in-aid. For the most part, this did not mean that the F.O. expected their 
every wish reflected by some itemised bill they picked up; more often the BBC was in the 
position of wish fulfilment in order to seek better funding. Speaking from experience as Director 
of the External Service and, following that, Director-General of the BBC, Sir Ian Jacob 
considered the needs of external broadcasting to be ‘a comparatively insignificant fraction of 
national expenditure’ for such ‘a valuable aid to the British international position’.35 Led by 
executives who appreciated its unique ability to serve the national interest, the BBC ‘seizes 
every opportunity to congratulate itself to show the authorities’, especially at Charter renewal 
or special committee, how wise their investment is.36  
 
 It was in terms of a return on investment that the BBC presented its case, more simply 
shown numerically through benefits to trade than the more ‘nebulous’ gains of goodwill. It was 
on those terms too that consecutive, repetitive committees scrutinised their activities, as one 
aspect of their information strategy and arsenal. Some reports, such as those by Dr Charles 
Hill in 1957 and Lord Plowden in 1964, in the end avoided giving external broadcasting any 
clear direction aside calls for further deliberation and the balancing of books.37 But the 
‘economic context’ was always present – a quid pro quo – to which the report of Sir Thomas 
Rapp (1965) considered more could be done to ‘project British trade and industry’. More 
importantly, perhaps because of incessant audits and the preparations for them, the BBC 
figured out their function as ‘trustee of the national interest’ where Browne intuited their rivals 
had not. The BBC recognised in its Handbook that programmes dealing in British scientific 
and industrial achievement – so placing it in Beeley’s ‘vanguard’ – were ‘appropriate to the 
increasing importance of international trade’.38 However much it was to do with constantly 




34 Beresford Clark in BBC Handbook 1964 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1964) p.20. 
35 Sir Ian Jacob on ‘The External Services of the BBC’ (May 1956) in Alban Webb, London Calling: 
Britain, the BBC World Service and the Cold War (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015) pp.166-67. 
36 Walker, Skyful of Freedom, p.114. 
37 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume V: Competition, 1955-1974 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) pp.705-08. 
38 BBC Handbook 1964, p.87. 
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 Managing Director of External Broadcasting Oliver J. Whitley attested that the real 
value of the activities he supervised was not that ‘they may help to sell tractors or nuclear 
reactors, nor even that they so influence people in other countries, nobs or mobs, as to be 
more amenable to British diplomacy or foreign policy’.39 Another ex-staffer of the BBC who 
has commented on time spent at Bush House for the World Service, Graham Mytton reckoned 
that any instrumental ‘raison d’etre’ was ‘only in the eyes of its funders.’40 But executives of 
external broadcasting were fully aware that to remain funded, and thus broadcasting, required 
a more tangible answer – one which stood up to testing – as to the question of why they 
should. In a lecture at Broadcasting House in 1972 as Director of External Broadcasting, 
tackling the question head on with the title ‘Why External Broadcasting?’, Gerard Mansell 
pointed to the ‘credit and good repute… as well as more tangible benefits in such fields as 
export promotion’ it brought.41 Referring to the ‘national interest’ that underpinned the BBC’s 
efforts abroad, simply and practically, Mansell deemed it right seeing as it ‘is what the taxpayer 
is paying for.’ That being the long and short of it he, as did Whitley, concluded that the ‘world-
wide influence’ earned for Britain by the BBC ‘must be recognised as being beneficial, 
desirable and probably unique.’ Thus, the reasons why the BBC broadcasted, both of its own 
volition and to prove value, are comparable with the nation-brander.  
 
Being Diplomatic about Propaganda: definitions and euphemisms 
 
Conversations about how the BBC acted in its service of the ‘national interest’ usually circle 
the issue of whether or not it did so as a tool of Whitehall. It is an emotionally charged debate 
in which nuance is sacrificed to naval gazing over ideology and independence, confusing any 
definition from an objective distance on the facts of what the BBC actually does. It has 
consumed understanding both inside of the BBC and out, as to its position in theory and by 
application. As argued, it is better to see it as an agent and agency of the national brand. As 
such, it is worth unpicking propaganda, and not simply as an embattled term in the abstract, 
to better define and interpret the BBC’s actions at home and, most importantly here, abroad. 
Ruminating on the ‘post-Cold War Information Age’, with one eye cast back over the 
communications arena that was the conflict’s principal theatre, Philip Taylor reasoned that 
propaganda - ‘in its value-neutral sense’ - would continue to provide the ‘ordered presentation 
of official interests’ amid ‘disordered reporting’. Its means would remain the democratic media, 
 
39 Letter from Oliver J. Whitley to Foreign Office in Briggs, Competition, pp.711-12. 
40 Graham Mytton, ‘The BBC and its cultural, social and political framework’ in Historical Journal of 
Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2008) p.569. 




although it forever ‘fails to see itself in such terms.’42 Taylor makes the point here that - contrary 
to a more cynical view of the media, either in cahoots with or controlled by the state - duty by 
one’s journalistic oath does not mean dereliction of it to one’s nation. As Julian Hale, formerly 
of the BBC External Services, said:  ‘The use of radio to further national ambitions is universal, 
even when the slogan is ‘Nation shall speak peace unto nation’ and the techniques used are 
quite different from those developed by the Nazis.’43 Without the purpose of presenting and 
promoting their home nations, and preserving the peace that profits them, international 
broadcasters simply wouldn’t have been set out in the first place. 
 
However ‘consciously inoffensive’ an external service is, ‘subversion’ cannot be ‘completely 
submerged’ within ‘vaguer concepts of national advertising’, or diplomatic euphemisms.44 
Here Hale is speaking about ‘government-sponsored’ broadcasters, somewhat 
disingenuously omitting the BBC from his references. This is common for BBC alumni, as we 
shall see, but the case is easily made for its inclusion. A useful outline to the purposes and 
various expressions of the international broadcaster, as applicable to the BBC as other 
stations projecting their nation, was provided by Donald R. Browne. Excluding the darker 
artistry of the ‘Coercer and Intimidator’ or ‘Converter and Sustainer’, who give the rest a bad 
name, there is the ‘Entertainer’, the ‘Educator’, the ‘Seller of Goods and Services’, and, in a 
phrase that crops up in BBC apologia, the ‘Mirror of Society’.45 The BBC really isn’t so unique 
in speaking ‘peace unto nation’ when, as Rutger Lindahl found in his survey of 1978, the 
motivation of better ‘understanding and co-operation’ is a common mantra. The widespread 
wisdom is that ‘goodwill’ accrued pays dividends in ‘politics/ideology, economy/trade, culture, 
sports and tourism’, which isn’t so much an ulterior motive as an obvious one.46 The BBC may 
not coerce or convert, but it is not void of purpose. The ‘Mirror’ reflects a trimmed, touched up 
image, as with nation branding – a way out of the wrangling over its role and record in 
propaganda. 
 
 As Anholt is also keenly aware, nation branding, especially for its association with 
politicians – neither disputed nor disputable – does not escape controversy over 
propagandism either. As among the chief practitioners of nation branding he is uncomfortable 
with, if not outright critical of its nomenclature. While being the ‘perfect metaphor’, as nations 
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become competitors in the ‘global marketplace for products, services, events, ideas, visitors, 
talent, investment and influence’, it is open to ‘misunderstanding’ by seeming superficial and 
cynical.47 This misapprehension with such a national activity is why John Lee, in editing a 
collection of essays by diplomats in 1968, preferred to distance public relations from the 
suspicion of publicists by opting for The Diplomatic Persuaders. These ‘persuaders’, noted 
Lee, ‘are not selling a cigarette, a soft drink, or a mouthwash. They are selling national images, 
understanding, and, in some cases, possible world survival’ in showing how ‘my ambitions are 
not incongruous with your own interests.’48 In communications, attempting to separate what 
one does from supposedly less scrupulous others is old hat; as founder of the Institute for 
Public Relations in 1948, Sam Black conceded the techniques are shared, but the ‘ideology’ 
is not.49 So too, ideology is what distinguishes propaganda by its various applications – if only 
subtly – into different forms. 
 
 For many academics propaganda, in defying any easy or accepted definition, presents 
an opaque, even insoluble obstacle when naming – without shaming – its examples. John 
Black, touting his theory of it ‘as being a conscious, organised attempt to influence attitudes, 
beliefs or actions primarily through the mass media of communications’, lamented that there 
are ‘as many definitions of propaganda as there are writers on the subject’.50 Jonathan 
Auerbach and Russ Castronovo assert that, put simply, it concerns ‘nothing less than the ways 
in which human beings communicate, particularly with respect to the creation and widespread 
dissemination of attitudes, images, and beliefs’.51 The etymology of propaganda has its roots 
in the Counter Reformation, which along with its professed – indeed, perverse – use by such 
20th century regimes as Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia explains why it has come to be 
synonymous with schism and subjugation. Thus, euphemisms abound, along with ambiguity 
and aversion. But if we equate all propaganda with its flagrant abuses, historian David Welch 
believes that it perpetuates ‘the misleading belief that propaganda has to do with “good or 
bad,” “right or wrong.”’ This ‘excludes activities that should clearly be defined as 
propagandistic.’ His own addition to refining the definition is, put simply: ‘targeted 
communication’ with ‘purpose’.52  
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Dovetailing nicely with Welch’s more rational and comprehensive definition of the practice, 
Auerbach and Castronovo contend that a fruitful approach is not to ‘isolate propaganda as a 
thing unto itself’ but to judge it by application, ‘in relation to culturally specific proximate 
institutions’. That is to say, assess it in its setting and as analogous with ‘teaching, preaching, 
selling’ or ‘publicizing’.53 Without touching the term propaganda, Simon Anholt brings together 
all manner of institutions that speak, acquire influence and, indeed, persuade for Britain. The 
British Broadcasting Corporation can be listed alongside the British Council, and even the 
British Red Cross, as instruments - ‘in many cases unknown to their domestic taxpayers’ and, 
perhaps, also themselves - of ‘soft power’.54 That said, ‘intellectual, communicative, creative, 
persuasive, spiritual and cultural power is tangible, measurable, and profound in its effects’, 
hence why Joseph S. Nye Jr. has since preferred the phrase ‘smart power’.55 Yet it is 
unsurprising that Sir Reginald Leeper, architect of the British Council, in spite (or because) of 
his wartime intelligence service was squeamish enough to discriminate its ‘publicity’ from any 
such connection. Again, as Philip Taylor reasons, we must define with reference to aims – to 
‘influence’ – and recognise ‘cultural diplomacy is very much an adjunct of conventional 
diplomacy’ – intended to serve ‘national interests’.56 
 
 Writing with a detachment mostly absent from the memoirs and histories of ex-BBC 
staff, Alban Webb called ‘diplomacy’ mere ‘euphemism’. And whilst one cannot plausibly 
‘accommodate’ the diverse actors and views, competing powers and conflicting actions within 
any case-closed assertion of state control, ‘the projection of carefully selected versions of 
British identity’ has been part of the External Services since their inception.57 The historian 
Anthony Adamthwaite said of the World Service that it ‘co-habits’ with the Foreign Office. Even 
John Tusa considered it fitting that the two figures carved into the facade at the front of Bush 
House should look, respectively, one toward the London School of Economics and the other 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: ‘The twin polarities of academe and government 
exercise their respective attractions very explicitly over Bush House.’58 However, as Briggs 
remarks, the BBC is ‘always at pains to insist on its own, separate identity’.59 For Andrew 
Walker, the accusation of there being any ideology behind judgments in Bush House is made 
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‘mostly by people with no experience of a radio newsroom’.60 This alludes perfectly to the 
duality of debate within and without the BBC, and its oxygen-sucking fixation on objectivity. 
But some efforts to clarify the BBC’s position in retort to its accusers have provided for a better 
understanding, too. Writing then as Director of External Broadcasting in the Handbook of 1968, 
Charles Curran employed Propaganda (1957) by Lindley Fraser to argue that the BBC ‘explain 
rather than proselytize.’ The principle of Fraser is just as relevant to a marketeer, in that ‘we 
can do no more than activate emotions that are already in existence, if dormant, and bring 
them into full play and vigour'. Curran advised his reader ‘remind our listeners of those 
elements in the British case which it would be in their own interest to recognize.’61 This is not 
predatory propagandism; it is perceptive salesmanship. 
 
Forward to John Black’s call to organise propaganda in 1975, he found it unquestionable that 
‘the BBC is providing long-term propaganda for the British "way of life”’ – the brand as lived 
by ordinary Britons; a macrocosm for how today’s tech giants are seen through their Silicon 
Valley technotopia – ‘and for British long-range political, commercial and cultural interests.’ 
After all, if it was not, as Mansell has concurred, ‘then the British taxpayer might well question 
whether or not his grant-in-aid is being put to a good purpose.’62 In his analysis of the key 
events that constructed a post-war settlement between the BBC and its government backers, 
Alban Webb finds that there was a ‘quid pro quo’ based on the ‘wonderfully imprecise concept 
of the “national interest”’ that established ‘an attritional kind of consensus’.63 Webb seeks to 
correct the BBC narrative of ‘heroically resisting’ the threat to its independence brought to a 
head by the Suez Crisis of 1957. While the government did threaten to take a hatchet to the 
purse strings of the External Services when it aired attacks on Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s 
humiliating, abortive invasion of the strategic Egyptian canal, it could also be ‘a witting partner’ 
away from the public eye.64 It is worth noting that ‘at the height of dysfunction there existed a 
rich, though hidden, seam of cooperation’, Webb says, citing a BBC-administered course for 
officials on ‘radio communications with particular reference to psychological warfare’ and the 
attendance of Hugh Green at a special committee whose ‘highly covert objectives’ included 
directing information strategy. This is instructive of  
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an institutional sense of diplomatic, political and cultural guardianship towards 
the nation’s long-term interests that became an essential part of the External 
Services’ corporate mindset and which has since become an integral part of 
the public service ecology of overseas broadcasting.65 
 
It is this inherent sense of ‘guardianship’, of duty to the national interest, which makes finding 
proof of some causal link with the state superfluous.  
 
BBC World Service: broadcasting which Britain? 
 
Finally, before moving on in the next chapters to consider what exactly the national interest 
and national identity were in the context of the 1960s, there is the question of which Britain 
the BBC had taken it upon itself to hold a mirror up to. Andrew Walker has called ‘nonsense’ 
the interpretation of authors such as Yoel Cohen, that the BBC has been obliged at times to 
include information about British life and policies which do not adhere to newsworthiness.66 
John Tusa denies any ‘special treatment’, declaring the BBC to ‘treat British writers, artists, 
actors, industrialists and scientists as we treat those of the world beyond’.67 To Ian Jacob, the 
BBC ‘seeks to hold a mirror to British opinion, and to reflect what the ordinary man and woman 
of Britain feels.’68 Although the BBC sought the ‘positive projection of British life and the 
exposition of British policies and British attitudes’, Jacob maintained that this was achieved 
merely by reflecting, not ‘conducting’.69 According to Charles Curran, with supposed inclusivity 
of all, ‘the way we think, the way we behave, the way we look at other peoples’ all figured in 
that mirror-image.70 In any case, as a 1948 note entitled ‘The Task of the Overseas Services 
of the BBC’ by Jacob had it, proportionate to the weight of its backing, ‘contradictions that may 
arise from presenting these views helps to demonstrate the tolerance which is a cardinal 
feature of British democracy’.71                                                                                                               
 
Browne is quick to point out, however, that ‘little is broadcast about those who are alienated 
from society, unemployed, abjectly poor, or frustrated in their attempts to change society’, but 
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for in ‘certain measure’.72 The hegemonic process toward consensus outlined by Jenks also 
impacted which guests were chosen, firstly, and retained as commentators thereafter. One 
such contributor, William Clark, testified in effect that ‘the BBC would bring in a variety of 
respectable journalists – but not too wide a variety – to discuss world and national events in a 
non-confrontational way’; reliable speakers ‘could stay within the BBC’s bounds without 
damaging their sense of independence and integrity.’73 And when negative stories were on 
the contributor’s crib sheet, Browne contends that credibility was only enhanced by reportage 
of ‘unpleasant aspects of British life, including possible racism’, reinforced by the broader ‘non-
threatening aura’ of the station.74 His rhetorical question punctures this figurative balloon 
perfectly: ‘Could a station that broadcasts the day’s cricket scores, including those for towns 
the size of Bourton-on-the-Water, possibly have any evil intent?’ In a similar vein the New 
Internationalist, considering the World Service in 1976 ‘about as disinterested as a railway 
built by British colonial administrators’ that was of mutual benefit to the colonised, thought the 
‘“soft” democratic image of Britain’ itself propaganda of a ‘subtle’ sort.75 
 
 It is for part two of this dissertation to analyse exactly how far the portrait projected of 
Britain was romantic or photorealistic. To the mind of BBC executives, insofar as professed in 
such texts as the BBC Handbook, an image that reflected both well and truthfully on Britain 
could be scrupulously achieved without contradiction. Curran even remarked on ‘an 
impression which circulates from time to time in some quarters that the BBC, in its external 
broadcasting, has some affinity with that part of the British press which was once thought to 
judge every country right but its own.’76 The impression given is that the BBC could actually 
be regarded as too critical of Britain, which, by inverting the gains made of credibility, would 
not present a good model for branding. But Mansell offered a perspective on how such 
brooding could support, or even be central to the brand, in a decade marked by cleavages 
within and between societies: 
 
… it is still possible for people the world over to see in Britain not the confused, 
disputatious, dissatisfied, disorientated society which we imagine ourselves to 
be, but a country in which there reigns tolerance, justice, sanity and 
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democracy, a country which remains the repository of a good deal of wisdom 
and experience of affairs...77 
 
In the end, Britain – so with every brand – was in the eye of the beholder. What remains for 
the next chapters, before interrogating how the image projected fulfilled the BBC’s public 
service – that is to propagate the brand, not manipulate by propaganda – is to consider what 
was the national interest and national identity of 1960s Britain, on which ‘Britain™’ was based. 
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‘National Interest’ in 1960s Britain 
 
In analysing how the BBC undertook its service in the ‘national interest’, it is necessary to 
understand both the term and the historical context in which the broadcaster operated. Certain 
broad, basic interests are inherent to a nation-state: preservation and prosperity, ultimately. 
Projection and branding have been presented as ways to ensure both, simultaneously 
elevating status abroad while shoring up consensus within. Particular circumstances and 
causes inform the basic national interests and influence how they ought to be realised, as the 
subject of continual conversation between a nation’s stakeholders. ‘National interest’ can be 
problematic, as political scientist Joseph Frankel found when conceptualising the term in 1970, 
given that there is no consensus on its meaning as divorced from the context of its usage.78 
Some attest a determination can be made from a nation’s place in the international system, 
its history and past policy successes or failures.79 Frankel agreed that the ‘national interest’, 
‘however vague and nebulous it may appear to be’ did exist through ‘basic agreement’, 
whereas societal divergence and sectionalism make ‘public interest’ more difficult to nail 
down.80 The Brookings Institution had for Frankel ‘acceptably defined’ it as ‘the general and 
continuing ends for which a nation acts’; if nations are thought to exist as the best providers 
for their people, then the interest is the ‘self-preservation of the system’ in order to continue 
that provision.81 The continuation of Britain as a world power in the winning camp of the Cold 
War can be classified as ‘aspirational’; employing force and making concessions to keep the 
British world together was ‘operational’, as was taking opportunities when advantageous to 
negotiate membership of a European club.82 Those who represent a nation intuit and instruct 
on these interests; their ‘basic agreement’, which we now explore, was the authority by which 
the BBC as servant of the ‘national interest’ operated. 
 
The pivot from Commonwealth to Common Market drives the plot for British foreign policy in 
the 1960s and shall be central to this study of national projection, as representations morphed 
to suit their market. First, we shall explore what spurred this market change: principally, crises 
of mood, maths, and modernity. The 1960s were a time of ominous prognoses. From the 
hindsight of the end of his tenure in 1969, Director-General Hugh Carleton Greene recalled a 
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time that had ‘brought out into the open one of the great cleavages in our society’ – namely 
that recurring struggle between ‘Cavalier’ and ‘Roundhead’. Britain had left behind a ‘largely 
imaginary golden age’ of ‘imperial glories’, with Greene catching ‘a fascinating glimpse of the 
national mood’ – ‘of sickness and insanity in our society’ – by reporting ‘as the brickbats flew’.83 
In his survey of the nation published in 1961, Anatomy of Britain, journalist Anthony Sampson 
recounted a telling interview with a cabinet member: ‘The trouble is we don’t believe in 
anything: we don’t believe in Communism, or in anti-Communism, or in free enterprise.’84 
Given the magnitude of change since the war, startlingly visible on a world map washed of 
imperial red, Sampson was not surprised about Britain’s ideological muddle. Writing in John 
Lee’s The Diplomatic Persuaders, as Director-General of British Information Services in New 
York and a Minister at the British Embassy in Washington, Paul H. G. Wright waged that ‘John 
Bull’ was in need of ‘Streamlining’. ‘We are in a great state of flux’, he recognised, and as such 
there was no wonder that the British image was confused abroad.85 Wright called on Britain’s 
Persuaders to correct ‘the fashionable view of Britain as a sort of has-been nation … It is 
dangerous for us because a nation’s well-being depends in part on the view and the 
confidence in it held by its friends abroad.’86 Any brand would suffer from such down-and-out 
status.  
 
 Covering 1951 to 1970 for The New Oxford History of England series, Brian Harrison 
opted for a title that encapsulates this chapter in modern Britain: Seeking a Role. One 
influential concept, not punctured until the 1970s, was of Britain as the third in a triumvirate of 
great – if not itself super – powers. With its missionary zeal and ‘ideal of fair play … quietly 
accepting both success and failure with equanimity’, Britain and its welfare model could be a 
moralising force; a ‘Middle Way’.87 But it wasn’t clear from where Britain would draw the power 
to play that role, be it the ‘national anchor’ of ‘kinship’ in Commonwealth, alignment with 
Europe, or the so-called ‘special relationship’ with the United States; or if bowing out may be 
for the best. ‘The dilemmas were painful and decisions were taken reluctantly or not at all’, 
hence Harrison’s title.88 There was also ‘the continuing tension between the UK’s hermetic 
and receptive tendencies’, the former binding it to English-speakers, the latter drawing closer 
through increasing ties to the continent.89 However, the pull of Britain out of its ‘cultural 
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narrowness’ and away from ‘geographical breadth’ toward Europe, far more proximate and 
opportune, did not promise an elixir for British perplexion. Walter Laqueur has 
(psycho)analysed a pan-European case of abulia – ‘utter listlessness’ – perforating the 
optimism over the continent’s extraordinary post-war recovery.90  
 
 This was acutely felt in Britain where many – mostly but not only politicians and 
intellectuals – were vexed by ‘the absence of a common national purpose and the general 
preoccupation with individual (or sectional) material interests.’91 In his history of the period, 
Dominic Sandbrook found a fatalistic mood among commentators who rarely disputed that 
Britain was ‘bottom of the class’. Newsweek remarked in 1963 that Britain was ‘wallowing in 
an orgy of self-criticism’, and Penguin Books reflected this self-deprecation in 1962 with a non-
fiction series titled What’s Wrong With…?92 Anthony Sampson had set about his investigations 
on returning from four years spent in Africa, ‘curious about the slowness and complexity of 
Britain’ by comparison.93 While the Head of BBC External Services Productions, Konrad 
Syrop, was conscious of such concerns and the crises behind them, stating that ‘the living 
pains of democracy… cannot be ignored or glossed over’, his question was what listeners 
might ‘conclude from this recital of problems and difficulties?’94 For Eric Hobsbawm, the 
lifetime of Sir Winston Churchill (1874-1965) provided the parameters of modern imperialism.95 
With his death, 1965 became a pivot between a fading past and foggy future. Labour MP 
Richard Crossman sensed in it ‘the end of an epoch, possibly even the end of a nation.’96 John 
Darwin dates this ‘world-system’ as having wound down by 1970.97 And while the empire as 
an idea remained ‘palpable’, says Philippa Levine, being publicly propped up by the United 
States and made a pariah by former subjects ‘led to Britain’s abandonment of its idea of itself 
as politically prominent’.98 Ashley Jackson further factors in that, in the age of supposed social 
‘permissiveness’, the environment ceased to be ‘permissive’ for the empire.99 This amounted 
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to not only a reevaluation of the interests of the nation, but a reflection on what and who Britain 
was, and wanted, to be. 
 
 So, where does this disquiet over decline and confusion over direction – this abulia – 
figure, if at all, in representations by the BBC of Britain and the British? Further, what was the 
level of popular interest, among the increasingly domestic Britons of a democratic Britain, for 
the interests that were supposed to be part of national survival? Were the borders of that 
interest to include the English-speaking world; the Commonwealth (Old and New); the ‘Greater 
Britain’ of white dominion; a European community; or smaller still, the home Isles themselves 
– perhaps even excluding those ‘others’ in the UK not considered ‘British’? Before delving into 
these problems of the British mind and identity, it serves to summarise three strands to the 
national interest in our historical context where Britishness is key. Firstly, the need to balance 
the books as necessitated by continual trade deficits. Emphasis was put on exports, asking 
whether Britain was still a merchant nation; the workshop of the world. Next, Britain as a 
modern, industrious and innovative nation, which Prime Minister Harold Wilson sought to 
reinvigorate through scientific ‘White Heat’. Lastly, seeking leverage in a world in flux, 
prospecting for power – and profit. This required Britain to make choices – and as the U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson made clear in 1962, a choice had to be made – between 
incompatible clubs: Commonwealth or Common Market. Was Britain global, continental, or 
resigned to retreat into a ‘little England’? 100  
 
A Nation of Shoppers 
 
For all the doomsaying over decline, there is – and was – debate over if and how far such a 
condition occurred. It should be noted that ‘decline’ is an ideological construct, as much to do 
with the heated ‘politicization of economic policy’ as cold fact.101 Remonstrations were in reality 
against growth that was relatively less than that of competitors; that is to say, Britain wasn’t 
so much anaemic as lethargic. But the British share of commerce was shrinking quicker than 
commitments were downsized, or rather not growing fast enough to support them – 
disproportion that could be terminal. The ‘special technical and historical circumstances’ that 
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had afforded for the gross pre-war scale of British enterprise, given the country’s small size 
and limited domestic resources, ‘had gone’.102 With it, Britain’s ‘shares’ in global trade and 
GNP shrank by more than half from the mid-fifties to late-seventies. It is reasonable to say 
that relative growth rates can also reflect the distance that others had to catch up, and did, 
whether for having industrialised to a lesser extent prior to war or suffering the wreckage far 
more of waging it. However, contemporary belief in decline is more important to us than any 
such reappraisal. Thus, correcting the ‘fashionable view’ of a bankrupt Britain might entail 
rewriting the story as told by Britons themselves. 
 
 Even so, Britons did not miss out on the so-called ‘affluent society’ that the post-war 
West lavished in.103104 The ‘jet age’ – so-named by popular magazine Queen – entailed an 
unprecedented ‘pouring out of pockets and wallets and handbags’ of cash to fund ‘unparalleled 
lavish living.’105 Queen cautioned against the ‘smugness’ risked by this new reality, juxtaposed 
as it was with concurrent decline. Not all this consumer wealth was spent within Britain’s 
domestic economy. On the continent other European countries were becoming ever more self-
sufficient in food and materials, as synthetics took over from the organic material that they 
lacked – oil excepted. Britain had become anomalous for a continent growing faster than the 
world average. Industrialisation programmes by Commonwealth countries meant less demand 
for the sorts of manufactures that had formed Britain’s entire model of trade, yet the latter still 
‘showed marked reluctance to abandon its ties’ with the former. 106 Sixties Britain was fast 
becoming a nation of shoppers, not shopkeepers. While the impression of ‘stop-go’ does not 
do justice to an economy that still expanded yearly by 1.3% on average, even during the 
stagnation of 1962, with wages consistently rising and unemployment negligible, the ‘strong 
and justified sense that Britain was falling behind her competitors’ held up to comparison.107 
Productivity growth from 1951 to 1964 stood at 40%, versus 100% in France, 150% in West 
Germany and Italy, and 300% in Japan. This situation perplexed policymakers, hence on 
succeeding Anthony Eden as Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan listed his priorities as restoring 
‘national confidence; clearing up the Suez crisis; the Anglo-American relationship; the need to 
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rethink defence priorities; the Commonwealth and Empire; and finally, the economy.’108 The 
last item was to make or break administrations.  
 
 While a deficit in the balance of payments can be deliberate, drawing imports and 
investment with a mind to increasing future ‘visible’ (outward produce) and ‘invisible’ (inward 
profits, interests and dividends) exports, an imbalance ‘is really only “unfavourable” if it is 
thought to be problematic.’ 1960 and 1964 served as examples of when and why deficits have 
‘been treated as matters of serious concern.’ Economist Peter Donaldson noted in 1965 that 
Britain’s concern was born from a lack of control over the capital flows in and out of the country. 
That the direction of payments was mostly outward was not deliberate, and neither was it in 
the form of desired investments for future ‘invisibles’.109 Donaldson had advised that  
 
a satisfactory balance of payments on current account plus a sufficient surplus 
to provide for a flow of foreign investment plus sustained growth of the 
economy add up to the need for an even greater volume of exports than we 
have so far achieved.110  
 
Solving Britain’s economic woes by balancing trade clearly occupied minds at the BBC and 
found support in its programmes. ‘Touting for Custom’ is the unapologetic title of Konrad 
Syrop’s essay for the BBC Handbook of 1966, in which he talks up efforts to engage with 
industry and invite enquiries.111 It is a striking example of branding in action, publicising the 
best of Britain through a catalogue of its innovations and inventions. As a category of output 
this developed in the sixties through programmes such as ‘New Ideas’, which Donald Browne 
noted ‘gives details each week on three to five new British products available for export and 
potentially useful to buyers overseas.’112 John Black found that while questions of purpose and 
impartiality elicit ambiguous admissions from the BBC about ‘projecting Britain as a “good” 
country’, be that propagandistic or not, it is not disputed that in promotion of trade they are 
‘regularly willing to put British interests forward more forcefully.’113 It would have been in that 
interest to ensure an image that sold, and whatever featured – be it a car or the factory that 
made it – was on brand. 
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 A central issue was that British manufacturers, exacerbated by an overvalued pound, 
could not compete with ‘better-designed European products’ and ‘cheaper Asian wares’, which 
import figures evidence were also more appealing to the domestic market.114 The automobile 
industry is a prime example of Britain falling from a world-leading export position, as of 1951, 
to be outranked by more competitive climbers such as Japan.115 The manufacturing disparity 
has another dimension when looking at the increase in car ownership among Britons, from 2 
million in 1948 to 9 million in 1965.116 The imbalance of buying in without selling back was 
untenable, with the Bank of England struggling to break even supporting sterling while 
taxpayers enjoyed unprecedented spending. And Wilson’s predecessor as Labour leader, 
Hugh Gaitskell, recognised that the situation could become self-perpetuating if Britain came 
to be seen by others as merely a relic: 
 
How can Britain look to other people if it continues to stagnate economically? 
Visitors will still come and praise the behaviour of our policemen and will say 
half pityingly and half affectionately that we are easy-going, kindly, tolerant 
people with a great and glorious past whose only trouble is that they are stuck 
to it.117 
 
It would be no good to have a brand which people knew but, given its image, would not buy 
into.  
 
Anachronism and the Amateur 
 
It was for the reason that the BBC could not resist ‘the pull of history and the fascination of 
bad news’ in its coverage – although it may opt to omit some – that Konrad Syrop thought ‘a 
special effort has to be made to restore the balance’.118 Negativity was often newsworthy and 
its inclusion sustained credibility. But in consciously ‘highlighting the positive side’ the ‘balance’ 
sought by Syrop was forced, and neither was it karmically neutral. Syrop pointed to ‘the 
dynamism of British science, technology and industry, the explosion of University education’ 
and ‘the spirit of adventure and service shown by the young’ to counter detractions, albeit 
necessary, which stole some of the shine from the grand narrative. In a sense he was right to 
use science as one vertebrae in the backbone of British identity, given that Britain, in spite of 
wrangling in Westminster, stood only just behind the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (3% of GDP) in 
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spending on it (2.3% of GDP) that had increased tenfold between 1945 and 1964.119 That said, 
politician Edmund Dell identified an ‘imperial tradition in industrial policy’ that, by focusing 
resources in nuclear and aerospace in a bid to sustain global leadership, explained Britain’s 
failure to modernise and properly invest across the economy.120 And while English becoming 
a lingua franca owed much to Britain’s place as the nexus for scientific exchange between the 
Commonwealth, Europe and the USA, by 1963 the Oxford English Dictionary had cited the 
‘brain drain’: ‘really able managers, scientists, technologists, and entrepreneurs’ leaving for 
the U.S.A. and elsewhere.121 
 
 Disputing that this ‘imperial tradition’ had left Britain ‘old-fashioned’ and 
‘noncompetitive’, diplomat Paul Wright had to concede a problem in perceptions by claiming 
that ‘the picture is not quite as black as it is painted.’122 Wright reckoned that exports in 
‘chemicals, metals, engineering products’ showed that Britain remained ‘vigorous’, and its 
shortcomings were no different from ‘any developed country.’ Anthony Sampson included 
chemicals as part of the newer industries which he indeed found had made ‘full use of 
connections with and the capacities of the universities to conduct R&D’, employing two-thirds 
of scientists as a promising sign of intent.123 However, older industries such as shipbuilding 
and automobiles had ‘taken exceptional persuasion … to embark on even small-scale 
research projects.’ Cross-party conventional wisdom had it to train more scientists and 
technicians, with new institutions and polytechnics in the sixties founded to take the strain off 
of redbricks which had absorbed a 130% increase in numbers through the fifties.124 But 
‘gleaming new engineering and physics laboratories lay empty and silent.’ Classicism 
persisted while reform was resisted, in what Calvocoressi has called a ‘self-perpetuating 
system’ of education for future educators that was totally devoid of thought for the economy.125 
And in any case, Calvocoressi maintains, scientifically staffed industries such as chemicals 
are only part of a story in which, ‘having won the laurels of pioneers England failed when the 
going got competitive.’126  
 
 Donaldson had ruminated on ‘accumulated evidence’ of ‘poor design, quality, delivery 
rates, and general salesmanship’ which could not be ignored as mere generalisation. He was 
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embarrassed to find some blame must be apportioned to ‘an ingrained British habit of mind’, 
as described by the Austrian correspondent of The Economist for a 1963 series entitled ‘Spies 
for Prosperity’: ‘regarding all foreigners as inferior.’127 It was Britain which remained much 
inferior in reference to the continent, compared to which its growth in real wages and labour 
productivity paled into insignificance.128 It was an uncomfortable fact that while ‘everyone 
talked about the need to export ... the efforts were often amateurish and the after-sales service 
provided inferior to that of other trading nations.’129 It appeared that Britain did not want to 
modernise or compete. But Harold Wilson’s call for the government to provide more fuel to the 
‘White Heat’ of modern industry proved electorally popular, both for its hope and contrast to 
amateurism and nepotism.130 This dissertation will enquire of BBC programming how such 
vision was given form in projections, knowing that John Tusa was not alone in taking exception 
to pressure from politicians to convey hallmark policy.131 Media representations were expected 
to keep to script, be the slogan of ‘White Heat’, ‘Enterprise Culture’, or whatever was presently 
the big picture for Britain. Ian Jacob reflected on his time as Director-General in the fifties, as 
a fairly establishment-minded figure, that ‘ministers don’t like us as a rule … because they feel 
very strongly that [the BBC] should be spouting their policy only.’132 It is to be presumed from 
this that pressure was resisted in favour of projection without strategy, or at least reference to 
the ‘interests’ of political rhetoric. 
 
 If Britain was to be the workshop of the world, or its laboratory, or a model of modernity, 
then much was at odds with that projection – expedient as it may be for the national interest. 
However, when Tallents had argued to ‘master the art’ of projecting the national image, he 
was plain that it should be a ‘fitting presentation’. It should be ‘for the sake of our export trade; 
in the interests of our tourist traffic; above all, perhaps’ it ought be fitting for ‘the discharge of 
our great responsibilities to the other countries of the Commonwealth of British peoples’. There 
may be some warts, and wrinkles, but the face should be of ‘quality and ambition’, possessing 
of ‘adaptability and modernity’ in – the apparently peculiar – ‘English craftsmanship’ and 
‘English science’.133 Questioning the likeness of such a portrait, Anthony Sampson ‘drew a 
great deal of praise from critics on all sides’ with his exposé, not of a cabal but rather the ‘club-
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amateur outlook’ fortified behind an ‘old school tie’ class in power.134 We will conclude from 
analysis of the content how far such ‘brickbats’ were reconciled with the brand in broadcasts. 
It would have been rational to exercise some economy with the truth, to ensure any 
representation marketed well. We turn next to considering which market that would be. 
 
Commonwealth and Common Market 
 
In ‘seeking a role’, Britain had to make decisions about whether its interests were best met in 
the Commonwealth or through the Common Market. It was a choice between salvaging 
through certain concessions a post-imperial union of the British world, spanning the seas; 
belatedly joining in with the European project on the continent, just across the English 
Channel; or resigning to play Greece to an American Rome, as its junior partner and 
beachhead over the Atlantic. What Britain could not contemplate was isolation to its Isles. 
However, it was neither obvious that a choice must be made at the dawn of the decade, nor 
had it then dawned that the choices were mutually exclusive. Gerard Mansell began his career 
at the BBC in 1951 and could later recall that ‘Britain still saw herself as the centre of the 
Commonwealth’, and Bush House ‘seemed still to be carrying something of the white man’s 
burden.’135 The circumstance of yet remaining as the head of the Empire, with Rudyard 
Kipling’s cause still at heart, was what would then have answered the question posed by 
Mansell’s lecture: Why External Broadcasting? But the World Service was recognition that 
times, and interests, had changed. While the Drogheda Report of 1954 had urged 
concentration on emerging states, the report of the Duncan Committee ‘was similarly 
impressed by the national preoccupations of its time’: namely ‘the balance of payments and 
the movement toward entry into the Common Market.’136 
 
 With Macmillan’s coming to power after Suez, overseas commitments were the subject 
of scrutiny through ‘penetrating and wide-ranging inquiries’ that sought to compile a ‘profit and 
loss account’ of Britain abroad.137 It was a hard-nosed exercise in getting the books in order, 
which laid the foundations of an official shift toward the European Economic Community as 
Britain’s rightful place and future. But there is debate over ‘the conventional view’ of Macmillan 
and Wilson resigning, even hastening ‘to scuttle [Britain’s] remaining commitments and fall 
back upon Europe’.138 There were ideological, aspirational interests still in play that interfered 
with realpolitik. Macmillan was ‘haunted’ by the dream of an ‘updated and modernised’ British 
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world; Wilson ‘bewitched’ by his own, albeit ‘more anaemic and ethereal’. The quick 
succession from the Empire to a Commonwealth, on to the final accession to the EEC in 1973, 
was ‘a painful surprise’. Studying the political scene of 1965, Herbert Victor Wiseman could 
call on the various offices established by Wilson – the Commonwealth Exports Council; 
Commonwealth Development Council; Commonwealth Career Service – to evidence a clear 
belief that the British world was still the right route for Britain and a roadmap for its economy.139 
And a Gallup poll of 1961 was reflective of public opinion that persisted in ranking the ‘family 
ties’ of Commonwealth (48%) far more important than relations with the U.S. (19%) or Europe 
(18%).140 
 
 The fact that the Commonwealth was an intricate, somewhat intangible, sometimes 
intractable construct may not have been widely known, not helped by the fact that the Empire 
Games and Empire Day had not been phased out until the late-fifties.141 But into the sixties it 
still constituted ‘an international association much more ambitious in area and potential than 
any hypothetical European union’, that ‘could mobilize deep-rooted family affections, historical 
associations, wartime loyalties, and long-established tariff-protected economic links’. The 
Nobel Memorial Prize-winning economist James E. Meade could be confident in cautioning 
against certainty between Commonwealth and Common Market, stating in 1962 that the latter 
‘means perhaps association with a more rapidly growing market; it means certainly association 
with what is at present a much smaller market.’142 The Commonwealth of Nations had been 
constitutionally ‘equal’ since the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and thus beyond diktat, but was 
at least bound together by the fact that Britain ‘purchased the lion's share of their exports, 
supplied their imports, provided requisite inward investment, and held their sterling balances 
in London.’143 And while certain large firms and sectors were lobbying for European entry in 
prospect of economies of scale, and some economists reckoned it was the shot in the arm 
that would restore vigour, there was no general support for striking out from a safe habitat to 
face survival of the fittest.144  
 
 Returning to the alluring idea of Britain and its Commonwealth representing a ‘Third 
Way’ in an increasingly bipolar world, a sense of duty also remained prevalent – and not 
necessarily imperialistic. Wiseman cited as his conclusion the ‘objects of leadership’ – said 
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inevitably in future to be shared among members – that had been proposed by Guy Arnold. 
These objects were the provision for a basic standard of living and economic ‘take-off’ across 
Commonwealth nations; fostering a truly multi-racial cooperative of ‘Commonwealth citizens’; 
and ‘breaking down the gap which exists between the Western and the Communist world’.145 
There was for many, even in the decade of Britain’s pivot to Europe, a deep meaning attributed 
to the Commonwealth and devoted mission acknowledged of it. The Commonwealth had a 
champion in the BBC, given its ideal was intrinsic to the founding of the Empire Service. That 
this remained part of the grain of the General Overseas Service is evident from the 
proceedings of the Conference in 1963 of Commonwealth broadcasters, held in Canada. 
Members ‘reaffirmed the mutual benefit of the Commonwealth conception and links’ while 
seeing broadcasting as serving ‘the preservation and promotion of Commonwealth 
interests.’146 The Conference in New Zealand of 1968 upheld the ‘most important theme’ as 
being ‘continued belief in the Commonwealth as an institution.’147 Indeed, Hugh Carleton 
Greene was proud that the Commonwealth ‘continue to look to us for a lead.’148  
 
 But Greene did not reflect popular concern for the Commonwealth – or simply the world 
beyond British shores. John Darwin posits it could ‘hardly be doubted that the sense of being 
part of a larger political world extending far beyond Britain was very widely diffused’, or that ‘a 
loud public voice’ backed the ‘“greater” Britain on whose power and prestige “little” England 
depended.’ That said, an ‘imperial interest’ of ‘broad public sympathy’ was lacking.149 The 
election of 1959 proved that imperial issues were ‘strikingly unimportant’.150 It was a topic 
tackled sparingly by politicians, glossed over with generalities or taken as a given that it would 
remain a going concern. The British voter consistently ranked foreign affairs and defence 
policy far down their list of priorities; both in the 1959 and 1964 elections, the economy ruled 
the ballot box.151 James F. Tierney of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies considered, in 
1958, that Liberal Party leader Jo Grimond ‘was correct in identifying as the “fundamental 
issue” what the “British people themselves are prepared to do and to give up for the sake of 
the Commonwealth”.’152 Britain did not appear inclined to consume less in sacrifice for 
something so obscure for most as to be, practically speaking, ‘other’. The next chapter shall 
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unpick how and to what extent the ‘British world’ and ‘civilisation’ figured in the identities of 
native Britons. 
 
By the turn of the seventies it was accepted that Britain had indeed been relegated from great 
power status and resigned itself from grandiose pretensions. The publication of a white paper 
by the incoming government of Edward Heath in 1971 demonstrated that the imperial idea 
had ‘sailed away to the Coast of Nostalgia.’153 In it, ‘few tears were shed over all that was left 
of the old British connections’, as a Commonwealth of Nations that did not ‘offer us, or indeed 
wish to offer us alternative and comparable opportunities to membership of the European 
Community’ was repudiated. In the same year, United States’ President Richard Nixon made 
clear his view that the world comprised five areas of economic power: the United States, 
Russia, China, Japan and, eventually, Western Europe, the interrelations of which would 
determine the future of world power.155 The fifth was open to ‘semantic confusion’ due to it 
remaining more of a ‘vague cultural-geographical concept’ than a bloc. It could be taken to 
merely comprise the E.E.C., or be stretched to include all of those Europeans not under Soviet 
influence; another composition was of the former great powers of Britain, France, Germany 
and Italy, but this definition was at odds with Britain’s own of Europe as ‘beginning on the other 
side of the English Channel’. However, a discrete British world of real ranking was now null 
and void.  
 
 Content analysis of programming in the London Calling guides will unpick the above 
threads of the national interest in output, woven as they were with projections of identity. It is 
true that the BBC did not advertise any specific product or sponsor one industry giant in 
particular; rather they were materials with which to build a brand, boosting all things ‘British’ 
as bearers of that hallmark. The sense of decline and absence of direction; anachronism and 
uncompetitiveness; a ‘mediocracy’ of the old school tie amateur; and ignorance for or lack of 
interest in, even contempt for the outside world would not be aspects of Britain expected to 
market well. However, trace amounts might be given positive spin, for example as showing 
modesty or ‘fair-play’, and mitigated within a bigger, more robust picture. That broader view, 
taken as it was from a British perspective, had in its sights the objective of balancing trade by 
facilitating exports. Crucial to marketing is the market, and the sixties were the decade in which 
the nation determined to ditch old dreams and go where business beckoned. This gradual shift 
from Commonwealth to Common Market, while no means foregone by 1970, will underpin 
analysis. Before that, there remains the tricky topic of ‘national identity’. The largest 
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corporations may rival the economies of small nations but cannot compare with even an island 
statelet for complexity. Thus, while brands try to create compounds, human society is often 





‘National Identity’ in 1960s Britain 
 
In order to investigate British ‘national identity’ in the 1960s an understanding of how the 
Empire and Commonwealth, race and Europe have figured in and interrogated ‘Britishness’ is 
key. Nations, nationalisms and identity are vast subjects that, invariably, this dissertation can 
not do justice. But a survey of the key ideas of academics in this field and the studies in a 
British context suffices to gain a grasp of the complexities when ‘projecting’ a nation, as well 
as offering an insight into the conceptual building blocks and boundaries of Britishness. In 
Imagined Communities, Anderson argued that nations, nationalisms and the identities 
involved are rooted in a collective imagination among compatriots, the majority never having 
met and without actual knowledge of one another, that they share some basic character and 
lived experience. It is a phenomenon based on belief and a sense of belonging, because of 
which Anderson places it beside ‘kinship’ and ‘religion’ rather than with ideologies like 
‘liberalism’ or ‘fascism’, as ‘Nationalism-with-a-big-N’.156 This implies something more 
personal than political; something felt rather than thought out. This supposed commonality of 
being, as opposed to view, creates a people instead of a party. For Eric Hobsbawm, the 
problem was that ‘we are trying to fit historically novel, emerging, changing and, even today, 
far from universal entities into a framework of permanence and universality’.157 This invention 
- or imposition - of nations since the early modern period is important for understanding the 
identities born from them. Often national identity has been conjured retroactively, constructing 
socio-cultural, political and racial history in support of the state it lends legitimacy to. This 
process of construction and reconstruction behind identity should be considered when thinking 
of it and its representations.  
 
 Prior to modern states it was not unusual for dynastic families to rule over diverse, 
discrete peoples, not necessarily united by lived experience but out of loyalty to the single 
crown of Romanov, Bourbon, Habsburg - or Hanover in the case of Scots, Irish, Welsh and 
English. Given this disconnect between monarch and country, Anderson asks what nationality 
the Hanoverians, for example, belonged to. Before the nation-state, the many strata of identity 
had been subordinated by fealty rather than through nationhood. Nations were consolidated 
by the formation of states that utilised a vernacular for their administration, then pursued 
policies of unification based on an official language. From this, national cultures were 
developed, forging communities that - in the case of whichever culture became primary to a 
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polity - rulers and the ruled alike came to belong to.158 The role that print capitalism, a focus 
of Anderson’s, played in opening up a mass conversation that was conducive to nation building 
has also been argued for the BBC, as it forged and reinforced national consciousness through 
common listenership.159 In her 2015 book, journalist Charlotte Higgins considered the 
broadcaster still to be ‘a crucial carrier of British identity: it binds us recognisably to ourselves’ 
through ‘shared experience and memory.’160 In turn, the Empire Service endeavoured to 
bolster an ‘imagined community’ of Britishness ‘not necessarily dependent on lived 
experience’, using ‘racial memories’ to invoke an ‘exile consciousness’, whether or not the 
listener in question – should they be ancestrally British – was an expatriate.161  
 
 By the 1960s, however, an occasion was not even made of the death of Winston 
Churchill in 1965 to express or excite ‘vestigial Britannic identities’.162 During the course of the 
1950s, if not before, the British family tree was trimmed to fit an image that was often racial; it 
withered concurrently with imperial control. But even the largest nationalisms, Anderson 
maintains, have ‘finite, if elastic, boundaries … No nation imagines itself coterminous with 
mankind.’163 In the context of the British Empire and subsequent Commonwealth, a lack of 
mutuality was not helped by the fact that neither was it contiguous, like the United States. 
Anderson looks on Victorian Jubilee processions as resembling the ‘random collections of Old 
Masters hastily assembled by English and American millionaires’, reflecting how only a 
minority of those occupying the ‘grab-bag’ of British territories had any ‘long-standing religious, 
linguistic, cultural, or even political and economic, ties with the metropole’.164 In reality the 
‘Empire’ was an ‘abstraction’, wrote art historian Mark Crinson, considering it ‘a host of 
disparate things’ drawn together by products, pageantry and paraphernalia – by such things 
as an Empire Service – that construct for it a ‘collective meaning’.165 Keith Robbins concurred, 
saying that ‘the British Empire did not dissolve as a single entity because it never was a single 
entity.’166 The reason that the Commonwealth was only a ‘specialist interest’ was that the 
Empire had always been perceived differently person to person, any sympathies for it 
selective, its appeal shallow – and ‘white skin-deep at that.’ 
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 The limits of imperial identity and common humanity were evident in Bush House, then 
home to the BBC’s external services and its multinational staff. Marie Gillespie is concerned 
with diasporas and ‘cross-cultural contact’ in such media organisations as the BBC, and saw 
the headquarters of the BBC World Service as a ‘zone of conflict’ where ‘colonial, postcolonial 
and Cold War conflicts clash and collude, and cosmopolitan and national imaginaries 
collide.’168 Despite being Commonwealth citizens working side by side within one of its chief 
institutions, any imagined community that existed did not translate into a sense of shared 
identity; a single culture, it seems, could not accommodate the many tongues spoken. It is 
also worth noting, as BBC World Service stalwart Graham Mytton commented in recollecting 
his career since 1964, that the culture of the broadcaster is ‘recognisably British’ but ‘not 
Tunbridge Wells, nor is it Hartlepool, Cardiff, Aberdeen or Blackpool.’ Recruiting in the past 
predominantly from the ‘professional middle classes’ and public schools, it was at once not 
‘mainstream’ and animated by the ‘internationalist, collegiate’ ethos of an ‘NGO’.169 As well as 
representing a type of Britishness instead of its totality, or at least overrepresenting impeccably 
educated cosmopolitans, to Mytton’s mind there was also a ‘conservative’ streak to staff of the 
sixties. If the BBC World Service were an international organisation, its charitable purpose 
was the civilising mission, whereby ‘the world learns from us, not the other way around.’ Many 
having spent time as colonial civil servants, they were biased by an ‘attitude of superiority’ in 
which they might bestow British virtues, not by the values of a multiracial, multicultural 
Britannic identity they sought to build.170  
 
And try as BBC officers might to inspire sentiment in Britain for a British world, either made in 
their own image or as a composite inclusive of Gillespie’s ‘cross-cultural contact’, BBC officers 
often despaired how Britons remained ‘ignorant, apathetic, or hostile’ to their efforts.171 
Kathleen Paul, a historian of race and imperial citizenship, finds that in reality there were 
‘communities of “Britishness”’ that reflected an ingrained incoherence of the Empire. While the 
state attempted in the British Nationality Act 1948 – whereby all remaining subjects were made 
imperial citizens with rights to free movement – to project the Empire as ‘liberal’, legal 
inclusivity only contradicted an exclusive ‘notion of who really did or could belong.’172 The 
‘facade of equality’ was fractured by a racialisation in which white Britons, Irish, Europeans 
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and imperial subjects, further split by ancestry and colour, belonged to and in separate 
categories. Subjecthood that was universal to both motherland and territories did not change 
the fact that ‘some subjects were more British than others’. The ‘true custodians’, born in 
Britain and bred of the right stock, proscribed government in trust of those who had not attained 
a civilisation yet capable of independence.173 While white Britons were being encouraged to 
emigrate and buttress the Britishness being displaced in the Dominions, migrants of colour 
with the status of ‘United Kingdom and Colonies’ citizens were upon arrival ‘rejected as 
members of British society because they had never been and could never become “really” 
British.’174 
 
Writing on ‘The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation’ in his 1987 book, There Ain't No Black in 
the Union Jack, Paul Gilroy critiqued Anderson’s theory that racism and nationalism are 
‘essentially antithetical’ because of the primacy of print language, meaning that one can 
become naturalised as part of a nation regardless of their race. In the British context, 
‘conceptions of national belonging and homogeneity … blur the distinction between “race” and 
nation’ with such idioms of identity as ‘Island Race’ and ‘Bulldog Breed’.175 One of the principal 
figures of race politics in the sixties, Conservative MP Enoch Powell continued to argue in later 
life that all nations must be ‘united by identity with one another … and that’s normally due to 
similarities which we regard as racial similarities.’176 Such ‘ethnic absolutism’ was publicly 
popular, even if ‘self-declared “British” blacks’ might be championed.177 The ‘social identity’ 
acquired by groups led Gilroy to ask the extent to which Britishness – or any national identity 
– can ‘displace or dominate the equally “lived and formed” identities which are based on age, 
gender, region, neighbourhood or ethnicity?’ Especially so where ‘domination and 
subordination’ between those groups, supposedly all British in membership, has been 
rationalised by an ‘appeal to the authority of nature and biology’.178 An identity thus comes 
burdens with asterisks depending on one’s other associations, be they in a political movement 
or prayer at the local mosque. Media representation may not find time or space for such 
clauses. 
 
 For Linda Colley, the ‘raison d’être’ of the ‘invented’ British nation, reliant on the ‘threat 
and tonic of recurrent war’ and ‘the triumphs, profits and Otherness represented by a massive 
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overseas empire’, was somewhat spent by the mid-twentieth century. Loss of contact with the 
‘exotic’ and resistance to Catholicism made it increasingly difficult for nation-builders to 
persuade for ‘an identity in common.’179 The role of the ‘Other’ in Britishness, be they 
Continental or Oriental, is of particular importance in this study, with one of its chief focuses 
being changing representation as Britain pivoted from Commonwealth to Common Market. 
How the candidacy for Britishness was considered of Kathleen Paul’s ‘communities’ illustrates 
how deeply an ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy still fortified identity. Replacing the British Nationality 
Act in 1962, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act set precedent – or confirmed a position – 
through choice of language in debate and legislation. Given that the ‘immigrants’ in question 
in fact held imperial citizenship, ‘it would have been equally appropriate to call it British 
Subjects Migration Act’. Instead, ‘the act carried the title that most clearly explained its 
purpose’: the refusal of rights on grounds of race. The voucher scheme introduced prejudice 
against unskilled jobseekers, the wording broadly helping to ‘define potential migrants as non-
British individuals connected to the island only through some legal error rather than through 
three hundred years of colonialism.’180  
 
 On the other hand, the treatment of Caucasians always differed to Asians or Africans. 
Officials ‘manipulated’ public opinion in support of Europeans, ‘clothing them in a discourse of 
potential Britishness.’181 Fearing ‘displaced persons’ from Europe were being lumped with 
‘foreigners’, the Committee for the Education of Public Opinion on Foreign Workers 
orchestrated features in magazines, broadcasts by the War Office and leaflets from the 
Ministry of Labour; the BBC pitched in with programmes designed to counter prejudice and 
promote assimilation.182 In practice, at the border, European aliens and passport-holding 
persons of colour from the ostensibly ‘British’ world had their status as immigrant and migrant 
inverted. While this implies a receptivity to Europe, memories of and memorials to the Second 
World War evidence a deeper cultural Europhobia to match racial xenophobia. It had served 
the Union as both tonic and triumph, which the BBC itself traded heavily on to restore 
Britishness at low ebb. 
 
The BBC and the Battle for Britain 
 
Nations and nationhood then, the British case in particular, are complex and controversial. 
Britishness has dimensions to it – imperial, racial, subnational, Continental – that are felt in 
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differing degrees and have been used to determine whether or not a person, regardless of 
their choosing, can be or could become a Briton. Representing this spectrum rather than a 
mere stereotype is, if not impossible, beyond any simple or single projection. However, as 
referenced from the work of Anderson, Colley and others, national identity itself is inorganic 
and often contrived. The role of the Second World War in redefining and invigorating British 
identity, and the BBC’s involvement in that, is a case in point for this conscious process and 
especially significant in this study. Weight went so far as to speculate in 2002 that ‘we would 
probably now be witnessing not the beginning of its end but the end itself’ of Britishness had 
Nazi Germany not interjected.183 When Sampson reflected back in his New Anatomy of the 
British nation, he recognised how wars against the Kaiser and Fascism had served as ‘great 
centralisers of loyalty, inspiring the outlying provinces with a sense of nationhood.’ Without 
France or Germany posing an existential threat, he did not think it ‘obvious’ why a Dundonian 
or Mancunian would feel loyalty to Westminster, especially so a cabinet of ‘London-based 
Oxford graduates’. Writing on the relationship between war and identity, Max Jones found 
polls reflected how people tend to use the former to substantiate the latter. It is little wonder, 
since ‘the union has been strongest when defined against a common enemy.’185 But the storied 
‘People’s War’ enshrined in national consciousness required a ‘people’, which the BBC had 
knowingly helped to fashion.186 
 
 As previously covered with concern to ‘dual identity’, there were problems in 
perceptions of Britain between the nations. Mass-Observation posed a question to its National 
Panel in 1941 that drilled into the difficulties with descriptors of identity: ‘What Does Britain 
mean To You?’ While most countenanced the various nations and regions as their fellows in 
nation, they were not widely considered to be countrymen; diarists identified as English as 
opposed to Scottish, Welsh or Irish.187 And even in the English case, where Britishness could 
be confusingly interchangeable, Britain bore the brunt of negative connotations and criticisms. 
Respondents associated Britain with ‘Empire’, ‘capitalist exploiters’, ‘self serving politicians’, 
‘class divisions’, and ‘a political system mired in outdated convention’; England was the 
cultural heart. The media rallied around the notion that, contrasted with the declaration of war 
by ‘England’ in 1914, the war with Nazi Germany in 1939 was one undertaken as ‘Britain’. This 
owed much to recognition that it would be won or lost together, cognisant of separatism as a 
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growing force that needed to be reckoned with.189 The BBC were instrumental in putting into 
practice the memo from above that it was Britain, not England that was the nation in war, and 
that the two were not synonymous. The BBC also conducted a domestic campaign for ‘The 
Projection of Britain’, designed to instill unity across nations and classes in reaction to a 
perceived lack of patriotic material. The authors of the campaign identified ‘a love of tradition 
and order’, ‘a belief in tolerance and fair play’, and ‘a sense of humour’ as the touchstones of 
national character that ought to be played up in programming.190 This complemented plans for 
‘deploying the poets’, fostering national pride through popular artists that were supposed to 
reflect the whole community of Britishness.191  
 
 The BBC had an arguably tougher task in reconfiguring Britishness for external 
audiences, crucially Britain’s co-combatants in the Empire and Dominions. This community 
was extremely diverse in respect of closeness to Britain, both culturally and geographically, 
demography and experiences of colonialism, and progress toward or attainment of 
independence. The Empire was thus ‘reimagined as a more collective, collaborative 
enterprise, partly through the language of the Commonwealth’, with Britain presented as a 
‘peacemaker’ in rejection of perceived ‘upper-class imperialism’. An example of this new 
messaging was the BBC’s Empire Day programme of 1945, celebrating the British world for 
its ‘rich diversity and an underlying unity’. Producers were strict that there was to be ‘no 
moralising or generalising … about the sun never setting, being brothers under the skin, or 
anything of that sort’. ‘Britishness as routinely performed within the British Isles could be 
censored for an international audience’, as evidenced by how producers of entertainment were 
instructed to consider any ‘judgment of British character’ that may be made. ‘Old school tie’ 
characters in comedy were acceptable for humanising colonial Britons, proving that the 
overlords could at least laugh at themselves, while ‘local’ jokes were prohibited along with 
‘cracks about Indians’.192 In the construction of Winston Churchill, it was to be a ‘war of peoples 
and of causes’, not ‘national ambition’, depending upon ‘the British race in every part of the 
world’.194 But while the BBC was promoting the idea of a ‘People’s War’ in a ‘People’s Empire’, 
the contribution and sacrifice of imperial conscripts and soldiers of colour ‘to the defeat of 
Hitler was ignored and then forgotten.’ The legend of the Finest Hour, the Battle of Britain, 
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became, according to Richard Weight, the monument to a ‘culturally homogenous and self-
sufficient nation’ that would be used later in a battle for Britain opposite to that waged by the 
BBC.195 
 
 Lastly and with special reference to the European element of Britishness, if it exists for 
most or many Britons, we must contend with the legacy of war in the first half of the 20th 
century when looking at identity in its second. While standing alone against Nazi-occupied 
Europe incited a sense of apartness – even aloofness – from the Continent, this was, as 
Michael Francis notes, counterbalanced by Britain acting out its leading role as ‘proxy for an 
often fantasised cosmopolitan European culture that otherwise would be consigned to 
oblivion.’ But while Britishness was shown to be ‘elastic’ enough to incorporate ‘a broader 
European sensibility’, being the last nation standing in a struggle between good and evil also 
lends itself to a certain superiority complex often seen in Britons vis a vis ‘Continentals’.196 
This complex, running contrary to Europeanness, was well fed by propaganda efforts to boost 
morale that heavily featured British victories over ‘jumped-up, power-crazed Continental 
dictators’ of the past. This constant restatement of the ‘island story’ by poets and politicians 
alike, summoning ancestral Britons who had preserved the nation against plots from the other 
side of the Channel, affirmed the exceptionalism of Britain against Europe.197 Reminiscences 
of the Elizabethan and Napoleonic eras were replaced postwar by the latest episode in this 
serialised conflict, where once again old foes were beaten against the odds in defence of a 
British way of life.  
 
Until the mid-sixties and even into the seventies, the Second World War dominated the British 
media, be it through themed comic books, paperbacks for adults, a genre of film that was by 
far the most prolific, or the persistent pumping out of wartime stereotypes and depictions of 
German politicians as Adolf Hitler by the press. Memorabilia of Winston Churchill, says 
Weight, ‘constituted a personality cult of Maoist proportions.’198 Pride in British victory and the 
unique values believed to have brought it was influential in discourse over entry into the 
Common Market, along with prejudiced views of a Continent ‘as inherently unstable, 
undemocratic and therefore too dangerous to be closely involved with.’ Iain Macleod, 
Chairman of the Conservative Party when Britain first applied to join, produced a report for 
Cabinet in 1962 on ‘Public Opinion and the Common Market’, finding ‘increasing distrust of 
foreign political connections and indeed of foreigners … fears that we are going to be “taken 
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over”, “pushed around”, “outvoted”, “forced into the Common Market to serve American 
interests” or “to surrender our independence to ‘Frogs and Wogs’.”’199 When Britain was 
denied entry into the Common Market in 1963, it was obvious from the lack of any ‘sense of 
grief’ that ‘Euro-enthusiasts were swimming against the clear tide of public opinion’, many of 
whom regarded Europeans still as ‘incomprehensible aliens’.200  
 
The bid to join the European project had been an exercise in dispassionate pragmatism, 
conducted entirely speculatively and without commitment. The attempt of a Labour 
government in 1967 was even more sparing of public participation. Of the debate that did 
occur outside of closed meetings, the sides broadly comprised ‘Europhile elite-oriented groups 
and Europhobe mass-based groups.’ Support fell the farther one polled from the most 
continentally proximate – and prosperous – South-East, and Harold Wilson had an even 
tougher time mustering his party faithful. Forging ahead without public involvement, or even 
that of party membership, aided the argument that Britain’s journey into Europe was one made 
without Briton’s ‘full-hearted consent’.201 Rejection of Britain’s bid was presented as a triumph 
by most of the press with the agreement of the majority of their readership, with the European 
Union threatening the Union of Britain. ‘Most Britons cared little about the Empire and did not 
mourn its passing’, summarises Weight, ‘but neither did they have much wish to become 
European. They were happy being Little Britons.’202 When mixed with an already inflexible 
notion of identity, this insular nature lent itself to an isolationist tendency; one that would 
contradict the very idea of such international activities as external broadcasting. Turning next 
to the programmes as listed in London Calling, we shall see how well representations of 
Britishness represented actual Britons - or more likely, what sort of identity a World Service in 
the ‘national interest’ espoused. 
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Part Two:  
London Calling and Britishness by Radio 
 
Having examined national identity and interest, the second part of this dissertation will 
consider how Britain and Britishness were represented in BBC external broadcasting. It will 
examine actual programme output, with reference to nation branding, in order to better 
understand projection and propaganda. The London Calling magazine guides are an imperfect 
source, as they cannot give the comprehensive view of what was said and by whom that would 
be afforded by scripts and recordings. A sense of how the content was delivered, its tone and 
aesthetic, the voices and the contributors they belong to is lost without full text and sound. 
However, these were either never kept or no longer exist in quantity sufficient enough for 
broad conclusions. While accepting that there are gaps to the listings found in London Calling, 
nevertheless it is an important and under-utilised asset for gaining insight into the content 
broadcast, in the round, by the BBC External Services. These guides provide a panorama of 
the programming and its themes over the course of what was a crucial decade for both Britain 
and its national broadcaster. With lack of detail on certain areas of the schedule in each edition 
comes focus on others, offering treatment of key themes and the editorial focal points. As 
outlined in chapter two, key areas of interest were balancing trade deficits, maintaining power 
status, modernising the economy, and, pivotally, making a choice between the 
Commonwealth and the Common Market; a British world or a European neighbourhood. In 
part two, we shall see this reflected in several themes: Britain as the place to be and buy from; 
Britain as the ‘middle way’ in a bipolar world; Britain as young and competitive; Britain beyond 
the British world. 
 
 On the topic of national identity serving national interests, there are features on sports 
and culture, the institutions of law and parliamentary democracy, history and heritage that both 
project Britain as a nation and British ideas universally. There are also programmes, both 
regular and feature, of an overtly advertorial nature; the BBC often acts not merely as a shop 
window but also as the sales representative within. The products of Britain chosen to be touted 
are as constructive of the ‘brand’ as the salesmanship that promoted them. When the 
launching of a new ocean liner is occasion for commentary, such as with the Canberra and 
Oriana in 1960 and the Northern Star in 1962, tours of the vessels aside details of ‘cabin 
convertibility’ and cuts to journey time do the work of the travel agent, while the description of 
‘a 45,000 ton product of the Harland and Wolff shipyards, and the largest liner to have been 
built in the United Kingdom since the Queen Elizabeth’ sustain the identity of a maritime nation 
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while leafleting for its industries.203 When considering that ‘the once-booming shipbuilding 
industry grew to depend almost solely upon Admiralty orders’ in this period, such brags were 
certainly to the benefit of British business.204 It was a story of boom to bust untold until The 
New Ship-Builders in December 1968 sought to ‘examine why orders are returning’ to ‘busy’ 
shipyards that were honing ‘new techniques and innovations’; this in the same edition where 
the image of a ‘modern, purpose built container ship’ shows the cost-cutting efficiency of The 
Container Revolution in action.  
 
 The free press and parliamentary democracy are common subjects. Again, the serving 
of interests – persuading new nations and pressuring old to pick the side of the ‘free world’ – 
also aligned with the rehearsal of key tenets of British identity for the Britain’s profit. The 
decade opens with Fleet Street - 1960, in which the owners and editors of the great 
newspapers, ‘famous the world over’, represent a fourth pillar ‘under constant criticism, as the 
Press is apt to be in a democratic country’.206 It is on their model that the International Press 
Institute, heard through its Director Jim Rose in The Fourth Estate, advocates internationally 
for ‘the ethics and practice of a free Press’. It is, says Lord Francis-Williams, ‘the one 
indispensable weapon in the armoury of freedom.’207 Later in 1960, three weekly products of 
London’s famed journalism were the subject of a feature series, including the New Statesman 
and Spectator, and it is The Economist that exemplifies a British mould. In such a paper, ‘the 
spirit of the great Victorians [i.e. their liberal editors James Wilson and Walter Bagehot] lives 
on.’208 The occasion of the 700th anniversary of the ‘Mother of Parliaments’ inspires several 
programmes, including talks in Government by the People on ‘how the parliamentary 
experiment has fared’ in Africa and Asia. Further situating the origin story of modern political 
movements in Britain, Aspects of Revolution traces the history of contemporary systems of 
government back through the French Revolution and the American War of Independence to 
the English Civil War – not to forget the Industrial Revolution that spurred further change.209 
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Such chronologies are common and place Britain in the privileged position of the sage, looking 
with maturity on the growing pains of political puberty around it. 
 
 The themes of law and order are also heavily featured in programming and contribute 
to British credentials for fairness and ethics. The effect of such a reputation for the making and 
upholding of rules is self-evident on those seeking to do business with the nation and its 
peoples. Sports provided a rich seam for presenting a British mind for rulemaking and 
mentality of fair play. English idioms are reeled off in the listing for an episode of Inside Britain 
entitled ‘Nation of Sportsmen?’: ‘don’t hit below the belt, don’t hit a man when he’s down … 
the game’s the thing’ and ‘be a good loser’.210 In the ‘English Courts’, a listing for one 
programme argues, one is drawn more toward the scales than the sword that the Blind 
Goddess of Justice holds: ‘while most peoples abroad look to their Constitution or to some 
rigid Code to safeguard their freedom, Britain still relies on her Courts, her Judges, her 
lawyers, and on the Law itself, to achieve a proper balance between the claims of society and 
the liberty of the individual.’ According to Alfred Thompson Denning, the Law Lord later made 
famous through his report on the Profumo affair, the scales err on ‘the side of freedom’; it was 
for this reason that former British territories ‘continue to recognize the Crown as the fount of 
justice.’211 Light entertainment as well as drama was used to educate the listener in ‘English’ 
law, as seen in Your Verdict. Each episode presented a panel, composed of Europeans and 
Americans as well as Commonwealth citizens, with a dramatised case in order to see ‘whether 
the verdict of the man in the street is the same as the strict legal interpretation of the case.’212 
The pride of place of legal practitioners in British life is attested to in Advocate Imperative, 
recreating famous cases and the oratory of barristers for whom ‘ovations … might have 
gratified the Beatles.’213 We will return to the Liverpudlian foursome, who are employed here 
to imply an almost Roman love of reason and passion for debate. 
 
 The English language and its literature are also, unsurprisingly, core subjects for 
programming. Having a way with words and their creation is central to the British brand, 
constantly reminding the listener of the uses of English as the lingua franca of arts, science, 
commerce and diplomacy. Given that the BBC was at the forefront of efforts to expand through 
education the understanding and usage of English, it makes sense that much was made of 
the merits of knowing, reading and speaking it. In terms of explicitly tutorial content, Walter 
and Connie..., the television series that served as the BBC’s flagship educational franchise, 
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crops up in London Calling in order to advertise it being bought and shown by other 
broadcasters. The central characters are a young married couple, observed in their 
domesticity in fictional Warchester; its bliss broken by situations not shorn of tension, such as 
in ‘Connie and the Burglars’ and ‘Walter in Court’, but all in good English humour. Walter is 
frustrated by a series of jobs, forced on him to provide the required settings for each episode, 
before finding his fit as a journalist at the local paper.214 This reminds of Julian Hale’s 
contention that an innate conventionality made ‘the BBC External Services no better or worse 
than the British Tourist Authority, with its thatched cottages, or Radio 4, with the Archers. ‘The 
danger’, for Hale, ‘is the extent to which these limited social attitudes colour political 
comment.’215 In the case of English by Radio, as with Walter and Connie… on television, the 
supposed ordinariness of middle-of-the-road, middle class stereotypes could colour ideas of 
British life, lending Britishness a false moderacy or consensus. 
 
 In seeking to cultivate understanding and appreciation of the English language, 
literature is a favoured route. No figure features more, again without surprise, than William 
Shakespeare. The quatercentenary of Shakespeare’s birth is marked on the front cover of 
London Calling for April 1964, heralding a catalogue of programming in his honour that is only 
slightly more profuse than usual. An article asserts that the ‘impression which the works of 
Shakespeare has made upon life and thought, not only in Britain, nor even in the English-
speaking world, but upon countries of widely differing peoples, cultures and traditions would 
be very hard to assess.’216 While ponderously noncommittal, this statement tends toward the 
assessment, hard as it is to make, that the influence is profound. My Word!, the panel show 
that paid homage to English phraseology in all its poetry and puns, decided it should ‘devote 
a whole programme to his works’ when ‘quite a number of Shakespearean quotations have 
already been used during the series’. Aside myriad musical and dramatic programmes, What 
Shakespeare Means to Me continues with ‘eminent’ guests of international stature speaking 
to the playwright’s global phenomenon, be they Argentine writer Jorge-Luis Borges, American 
and Egyptian actors Jose Ferrer and Yusef Wahby, or former Director-General of Radio 
Pakistan, Z. A. Bokhari.217 Showing that the 400th anniversary of his birth did not mean any 
special treatment of Shakespeare and his works, in October Such Sweet Thunder presented 
translations in some 21 different languages: ‘Romeo wooing Juliet in Chinese, German, 
Arabic, Hungarian and English … and Lady Macbeth will pursue her wicked course in Polish, 
Hebrew, Telegu and Greek.’218 The genius of the English language, its masters and 
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masterpieces is clearly to be taken as granted. That the lingua franca of the world happened 
to have originated in Britain was obviously to the benefit of the British brand; connotations of 
power were not, however, substitutes for the real thing. We turn next to power as our first 
primary theme.  
 
‘Great’ Britain in a Bipolar World 
 
Ruminations on a new role as the ‘Third’ or ‘Middle Way’ was recognition that Britain’s power, 
if it could still be considered great, was below that of the United States and Soviet Union in 
the pecking order, or at best between them in a new post-war dynamic. The fact that Britain 
was by no means of equal superpower status in this triumvirate, however the balance of power 
might be conceptualised, could not be ignored and, indeed, was not in BBC programming. 
This relegation from the first order was plain, if not otherwise proven, in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of October 1962. Programmes in June of 1963 on the Soviet and American leaders 
involved, Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy, are listed in London Calling under the 
headline, ‘The Men Behind the Power’, reflecting how their confrontation had shown that 
‘survival or destruction’ of the world rested in the hands of these leaders of ‘the two most 
devastating concentrations of power in history’.219 A series of talks in 1961 on the Challenge 
of our Time, when political atlases ‘are no sooner published than they are out of date’, 
acknowledged the supremacy of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., with China ‘striving to make up the 
leeway of the lost years.’ In 1962, New Society declared a ‘climate of uncertainty’ in Britain, 
‘assailed by doubts about our – and our country’s – position in the world’; a Gallup Poll had 
even asked Britons how they felt about ‘becoming more like Sweden and Switzerland’.220 But 
the BBC was unwavering about the respect due to the Commonwealth of Nations, ‘which has 
already shown that friendship with independence can be a mutually enriching experience’, 
whereas the ‘suspicious tolerance’ of East-West relations ‘seems to defeat the hope of 
wholehearted and fruitful collaboration.’221 The model of another ‘Way’ is well made out by 
positive coverage and comparisons in the General Overseas and World Service; the 
Commonwealth community was the spine of British pretensions to power, the treatment of 
which as a theme over the decade we will return to. 
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 As previously discussed, part of the pitch for Britain’s role and continued seat 
reservation at the top table was its position as moderator between the leviathans of East and 
West, demonstrated by Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee in the 
conferences of the ‘Big Three’ at the climax of war in 1945. That said, Britain was firmly 
ensconced in the Western camp and avowedly anti-Communist. The BBC was engaged in a 
War of the Black Heavens with the Soviets, investing heavily in their own propaganda while 
spending exorbitantly on jamming others.222 Of the two Prime Ministers of the sixties, Harold 
Macmillan ‘saw Britain as playing Greece to the USA’s Rome’ and Harold Wilson remained 
through his tenure a ‘keen proponent of Britain’s supposedly special relationship’, ‘cock-a-
hoop with pride’ in his first meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson.223 Hungarian intellectual Arthur 
Koestler, introducing an edited collection of essays on the Suicide of a Nation that first 
featured, to acclaim, in the magazine Encounter, considered the ‘Graeco-Roman analogy … 
arrogant nonsense or, to be more polite, just plain silly.’ Continental ‘joie de vivre’, its ‘cultures 
by no means inferior to ours’, contrasted sharply with ‘the rate at which we develop stomach 
ulcers.’224 It was by no means clear why new powers, or new nations, would accept the 
instruction of an infirm Britain.   
 
 Playing up the idea of the British as an elder statesman of the international order, wise 
counsel and ‘honest broker’ to the new superpowers, were programmes that offered 
journalistic and academic critiques of American democracy and Soviet communism.225 One 
such regular series, produced for the domestic Home Service and primarily ‘to inform the 
people of Britain about the people of the United States of America’, was Alistair Cooke’s Letter 
from America. In London Calling a write-up on the programme reasoned its inclusion in 
General Overseas Service schedules was important ‘since the mood, character and doings of 
the great and often perplexing country he talks about are of more than a passing interest to 
the world at large’ – as presumably is the judgment of a British commentator.226 Later, the 
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Five programmes examine the background and direction of American policies 
and the problems facing the United States today. English and American 
experts will consider How United is the United States?; The Power of the 
President; Society Under Pressure; Isolation or More Vietnams?; and The 
Future: American Dream or Nightmare?227 
 
Given such a tough ‘perspective’ offered by ‘English’ analysts, Britain certainly appears 
uncompromised and, in image terms, uncompromising. Such unrestrained assessments of 
Soviet Russia and its satellite states are more common and less remarkable, although 
presented as objective and unemotional expositions rather than exposé. The reputation for 
British fairness and its role in the ‘middle’ is helped by the platform given to such figures as 
John Gallam, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain.228 So too, the 
BBC carried this responsibility to act as the conciliator of East and West and similarly 
trumpeted its achievements in opening conversations, as seen in the bulletin of a summit with 
their Soviet counterparts printed in July 1963: agreements included ‘interchange of 
programmes’, ‘provision of facilities on either side’, ‘attachment of members of staff’, and a 
visit of the Director-General to the U.S.S.R. Broadcasting Organization.229 And when there is 
a series of talks on the Newspapers of the World, whose ‘handling of news and comment can 
exert an enormous influence for good or evil’, one of the contributors was the Deputy Chief 
Editor of Pravda, Vadim Nekrasov.230 
 
 Through BBC programmes the listener is also led to believe in a British identity not 
tending toward crisis when under scrutiny, but rather welcoming of it and able to own up to 
mistakes. The recently published memoirs of Anthony Eden were reviewed in 1960, covering 
‘the 1954 Geneva conference on Indo-China, the breakdown of the plan for a European 
Defence Community, the Persian oil dispute, and the revolution in Egypt’. However, the climax 
of this first volume is said to be ‘the decision of the British and French governments to 
intervene’ in Suez, which removes any premeditation from that intervention.231 It is of note that 
the guest expert chosen to give a reading of Eden’s account is Lord Strang, a member of the 
General Advisory Council of the B.B.C. who avidly defended the broadcaster through its 
nervous standoff with the then Government. A former Head of the Foreign Office, Strang stood 
in the House of Lords in 1957, in the fallout of the showdown over Suez, to accuse that ‘the 
art of hobbling an organisation without entirely crippling it is one which is well understood and 
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practised in Whitehall.’232 When the BBC came under fire for helping to birth a satire boom 
through its controversial television series That Was The Week That Was, Strang’s impression 
was that, if anything, there was ‘too much fooling around and not enough bite’.233 On the topic 
of TW3, London Calling used the programme as ‘evidence of political maturity’ in Britain; Mr. 
Kenneth Adam, writing as Director of BBC Television, clearly did not foresee it being axed for 
reaching and then crossing the line during the election of 1964. Nevertheless, a Canadian 
journalist is quoted attributing to it ‘a healthy, enquiring, irreverence almost totally lacking in 
Canadian and U.S. public affairs programmes.’234 
 
 While beating a retreat from past hegemony allowed Britain to embrace a post-imperial 
image – ‘more in tune with the spirit of the times’, as Gerard Mansell remarked – this did not 
mean that martial prowess was not part of British identity as portrayed by the BBC.235 In 1960 
a series about Training for the Services starts with the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 
before covering the Royal Naval College and Royal Air Force College; in its listing in London 
Calling, high-profile overseas graduates are referenced from General Mohammad Ayub Khan 
to King Hussein.236 The Sandhurst Tradition again draws attention to the famed institution in 
1966, now ‘a far cry from the insular beginnings of the college’ with its overseas cadets making 
up one in seven of the officers in training.237 As another ‘of the most famous British institutions’, 
the tercentenary of the Royal Marines is marked by a programme that proudly recounts how 
its soldiers ‘drove the first armoured vehicles on to the beaches of Normandy in 1944’ and 
‘provided some of the finest Commando units.’238 Honour and heroism are woven into such 
tales of British arms – a military history where Britain is shorn of any belligerence – as the 
1961 reconstruction of the ‘Yangtse Incident’ of April 1949. A stalemate ensued when a British 
frigate on a ‘routine visit to Nanking’ was forced ashore after taking fire from the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army, during the fighting of what would be the final phase of their Civil 
War. The listing tells the story of how Lieutenant Commander John Kerans resisted ‘the 
preposterous demands the Communists were making before they would guarantee safe 
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 If past conflicts provide the material for representations of British gallantry and the 
professionalism used to tutor the armed forces of its friends, then modern military capacity is 
showcased through the declaration of nuclear power occasioned by the launching of H.M.S. 
Dreadnought, Britain’s first atomic submarine.240 The Queen presided over the ceremony, as 
she does at the various other military events covered by special BBC broadcasts, most 
prominently the annual Trooping the Colour on the monarch’s official birthday. Elsewhere, 
White Mice to Dreadnoughts charted British submarining ‘through two world wars and 
intermittent peace to the nuclear Dreadnought of today.’ The story of Submarine Branch is 
told by Captain Anthony Kimmins with those who have served on the vessels, now ‘nearly 
sixty years old’, so handling an important part of the history of the Royal Navy that it is said, 
in total, ‘could scarcely be compressed into a hundred programmes’.241 However, rarely is a 
glimpse caught of British forces deployed in the contemporary world, fighting the ‘brush fires’ 
in Malaya or Kenya or Aden which Charles Curran alluded to; a programme on the Gulf states 
in 1969  asked ‘How do they see their future when by the end of 1971 the British military 
presence in the Gulf is withdrawn, the end of a long chapter in their history?’242 What is not 
wondered aloud is how this severing of commitments ‘east of Suez’, the conclusion of a major 
chapter in British history also, might mean the ‘dramatic farewell to Britain’s world role’.243 
 
 Grandiose displays of scientific advancement were as prized as those of strength in 
the great power politics of the Cold War, the central expression of which being the ‘Space 
Race’. 1961 saw the first man in space, the Soviet Union’s Yuri Gagarin, and 1969 the 
American moon landing of Apollo 11. It was a contest fought between superpowers that, 
crucially, had the enormous manpower and economic resources to run extraordinarily costly 
research programmes. Naturally, the BBC closely followed this dramatic and awe-inspiring 
competition. What is remarkable is that in the listing for one such programme in 1960, no 
longer debating post-Sputnik ‘whether a human being will ever be put into orbit’, the question 
is ‘when’ the first man goes to space whether he might be ‘American, Russian, or British?’244 
Efforts appear to be made to bracket Britain within the primary participants – albeit a respectful 
‘Third’, as ever – in other programmes. Dr. Robert Boyd, Head of the Space Research group 
at University College, London, ‘justifies the expense of British space research’ in an episode 
of Research Project in 1962, discussing ‘the scope available for smaller nations which will be 
later entrants in the space race.’ Boyd is among those working on Britain’s Scout Satellites, 
which it is said when launched ‘will incorporate completely new experiments which have not 
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yet been carried out by either America or Russia.’ But ‘before our own Blue Streak is available’, 
the listing goes on, these along with other projects by ‘European countries, led by Britain’ will 
be carried into orbit by American rockets.245 Understandably Blue Streak, an unmitigated 
failure eventually traded for the American-bought Polaris, is never mentioned in the schedules 
again; in the words of journalist Bernard Levin it served as ‘a dreadful symbol of the country’s 
erratic attempts to move into the future, a paradigm of national impotence’.246 
 
 A fortnight following the famous speech of 1962 by President John F. Kennedy in 
Houston, Texas, imploring Americans to ‘choose to go to the moon’ in the name of ‘knowledge 
and peace’ and urging that its ‘conquest deserves the best of all mankind’, the BBC were 
anticipating that ‘every careers master must be prepared for questions about astronautics from 
school-leavers and from pupils even younger.’247 The programme referenced, Eyes Up!, 
offered up ‘British achievements in outer space’ to a younger audience who, unless American, 
were as unlikely as Britons, adolescent or adult, to pilot any NASA rocket.248 Coming back 
down to earth, another line of programming on The Exploration of Space, as shown in one talk 
of that title, looked at the space race as hubris with a typical question being ‘how much of the 
assorted ironmongery circling the earth today owes its origin to national and political 
prestige?’249 Further into the decade the BBC might still position Britain as a runner in the race 
to space, worrying if it now ‘lagged dangerously behind’, but began to cast doubt on ‘any 
positive value for the growth and well-being of mankind’ in the enterprise - ‘a useless 
digression which we may choose to ignore in the future?’250 Britain was involved in such 
explorations purely for the sake of science and the possibilities of some utility, and it was on 
behalf of ‘mankind’ that the BBC interrogated not only the ‘dubious’ value of men on the moon, 
but the ‘military motives, and the desire to impress the rest of the world with spectacular feats’ 
of the Americans and Soviets.251 The sober British, by clear contrast in the programming, do 
things for the right reasons. 
 
 Another area of international rivalry, from the inception of the modern Olympiad to 
today, was the Olympic Games. Coverage of the Olympics is not missing from schedules in 
which sport was prevalent, with London Calling making sure to mention that it was in Britain 
‘that modern athletics were developed (after Oxford-Cambridge matches of the mid-nineteenth 
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century)...’. But if the Games were a stage on which to showcase not only sporting 
achievement but national status, Britain woefully underperformed throughout the sixties; 
medal counts placed British athletes behind such lower-order powers as Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and even Britain’s Commonwealth subordinate Australia at Tokyo (1964) and Mexico 
City (1968), while not even finishing in the top ten in Rome (1960). Britain could however show 
humility about this mediocrity – as well as take a moral stance on what it, and the BBC, saw 
as the erosion of the spirit of the Olympiad. A series previewing the Games in Rome, Talking 
about the Olympics, attested to the threat to its ‘genuinely amateur nature’ from it being turned 
into a ‘testing ground’ for West versus East, drawing on a report by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.252 In 1964, Britain in the Olympics posed the 
question to the British athletes contributing to the programme, ‘does the old Greek ideal of 
competing for honour alone still count in an era of intense national prestige?’253 If the British 
could not occupy a rung higher than Japan or Germany (East and West) in the medals table, 
they could at least occupy the higher ground among the great powers. 
 
 Before moving on to the theme of competitiveness with regards to science and 
industry, of anachronism and modernity, much could be said and, indeed, was made of 
Britain’s part in international organisations and overseas aid. At the dawn of the decade, 
Britain’s position in the hierarchy of the United Nations and commitment to global development 
are made beyond question. In one of a series of prophetic talks about the Prospect for the 
1960s, on the topic of food and population, a meeting of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science is said to be ‘the opening salvo’ of the U.N.’s Freedom from Hunger 
campaign.254 British figures within the various agencies of the U.N. are frequent contributors 
to programmes that are obviously intended to meet the interests of listeners who may well be 
in receipt of its campaigns, but also foremost advertises Britain’s role. ‘As important as the 
financial aid Britain provides for developing countries is the technical advice and assistance 
given by her consultants’, which Experts from Britain was able to give positive coverage to 
through interviews with those men and women on their assorted assignments.255 Compared 
to exorbitant sums lavished on space programmes without clear reward – ‘Whitey on the 
moon’, as put acerbically by the sixties poet Gil Scott-Heron – British investment in concrete 
aid is boast-worthy.256 And the BBC did boast, in 1969, that ‘Britain is among the top three or 
four countries contributing to overseas aid. The British contribute not only as tax-payers, but 
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through churches and voluntary societies, and thousands offer their skills for service 
overseas.’257 Such a power, with its ‘Middle Way’ of Welfare State and Western democracy, 
was presented as an antidote to the Cold War dichotomy. Furthermore, this new role is 
perfectly fitting for British identity. No one would have been led to the same conclusion of a 
‘national hardening of the arteries’ as the Spectator’s Anthony Hartley, the British descending 
into a limbo of ‘decadence’, ‘decline’, and ‘the loss of purpose’.258  
 
Modern Britain and the ‘New Men’ 
 
A chief national interest of Britain in the 1960s was balancing foreign trade, the economic 
necessity of which was the operative force behind most other political and diplomatic change 
that occurred. If the ends for which power is coveted are reliant on economic means, as Paul 
Kennedy concluded, then Britain had to compete economically, first and foremost, if it was to 
be able to stake any claims in the greater geopolitical competition. The fact that the External 
Services of the BBC provided a pro bono advertising outlet for British firms is both explicitly 
recognised in the writings of executives, and abundantly clear in the content broadcast. The 
BBC Handbook accepted uncontroversially that a purpose of external broadcasting is ‘to act 
as a shop window’, flaunting rather than acquiescing to this fact in 1960 by counting how one 
programme had ‘described some 1,500 new products and processes and mentioned some 
300 British firms by name.’259 Later Handbooks do not fill so many paragraphs, if not pages, 
with testimonials to these efforts. 1959, on the other hand, is reflected on with a certain pride 
for having reported on, ‘As far as is possible, every invention, new product, major contract, 
show, and exhibition … and followed up in the daily and weekly scientific and industrial 
reviews’. While not the first function of external broadcasting, it is argued - perhaps with 
Whitehall officials and future committees in mind - that ‘it can do much to create an atmosphere 
of knowledge and confidence overseas whereby the sales of British goods and services will 
be facilitated.’260 This ‘atmosphere’ and its effect on audiences sounds remarkably akin to 
branding, whereby the brand awareness and image instilled by certain products and their 
manufacturers rubs off well on other things of similarly British origin and, it follows, genius. 
 
 The listing for a feature series showing ‘the real care and attention given to detail’ of 
firms manufacturing Made to Order products represents well how the BBC in reality served 
not simply as a showroom for British goods, but more broadly to market Britishness. ‘Britain is 
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not just an old country’, the Duke of Edinburgh is quoted as saying in his speech at the British 
Exhibition in New York, ‘if you suspect we are living in the past, forget it … get a balanced 
view of Britain, right through to our scientific and technological achievements … three out of 
every five gas turbines flying, or on order, in the entire Western world are British’. This view, 
the listing affirms, ‘has been reflected in many programmes in the General Overseas 
Service.’261 Prince Philip was the most popular of the Royal Family, striking a chord with the 
public when castigating elites for not having ‘pulled [their] fingers out’.262 The BBC clearly 
preferred the Duke’s talking Britain up to his dressing it down. When in a future episode of this 
particular series it is the plastics industry being inspected for its craft and customer service, 
the listing is gushing about Britain’s role in the material’s development: the invention of 
celluloid in 1865 in Birmingham is followed by Perspex, which ‘played a valuable part in 
wartime’; polythene – ‘originally British’ – by polystyrene, also ‘first manufactured in Britain.’263 
This retracing of the steps behind a major field of modern research and manufacturing, 
marking out Britain’s sizeable footprint, is beyond mere promotion of a particular export – it 
creates a story in which the British are endowed with scientific excellence. How exactly such 
programmes were presented on air, whether they carried the same purpose to champion and 
to cultivate, is roundly answered by the host of New Ideas. Explaining what to expect from this 
regular programme and his presentation of it, Allan Murray remarks that ‘To keep an eye on 
British inventions, techniques and discoveries, and size up their possibilities ... is like trying to 
read an encyclopedia by flashes of lightning.’264 
 
 Made to Order was among feature series that were supplementary to regular 
programming on the subject of scientific progress and industrial production, principally 
Science & Industry, which fielded enquiries from across the world while exhibiting British 
achievement abroad such as the £1m Durgapur Steelworks in India.265 Following the theme, 
1968’s Made in Britain described ‘four spheres in which Britain’s achievement has always held 
its own against foreign competition.’ This cherry-picking approach focused attention on ‘such 
pioneers’ as Sir Alliott Verdon Roe of aircraft manufacturer Avro; Lord Ernest Rutherford, New 
Zealand–born British nuclear physicist; and Walter Owen Bentley, the automobile and aircraft 
engineer who founded Bentley Motors.266 As aspects of industry it is apt that nuclear, planes 
and cars form the core of the programme, being that they do across programming in general. 
Rutherford, ‘described as the greatest scientist since Isaac Newton’, on whose discoveries - 
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at Cambridge - ‘rests the whole of modern nuclear physics’, is often used to demonstrate the 
hand Britain had in making the atomic age.267 The great physicist is named alongside the 
Curies, Bohr, Geiger, Chadwick and Hahn as the eminent predecessors of contemporary 
British researchers harnessing ‘nuclear energy for peaceful use’ in a special programme 
recounting The Road to Dounreay - the power station in Pentland Firth that was employed to 
counter those believing Scotland to be behind the times. The ‘Giant Ball’ of the reactor building 
adorns the front cover of this edition in Volume 2, typically found wanting of imagery.268 When 
the British Exhibition in Tokyo, 1965, gets the write-up and report customary for these shows, 
the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority has its own hall, London Calling refers, for two 
working models of the ‘British designed’ nuclear stations constructed to serve the Japanese 
capital. 
 
 It was par for the course that the other hall at the Tokyo Exhibition – aside a third 
‘devoted to the “Spirit of Britain”’ and its ‘creative genius’ – was given over to the Society of 
British Aerospace Industries and various motoring firms.269 The BBC World Service, and 
General Overseas Service before it, served the function of a permanent exhibition on the 
model of these three ‘halls’. Turning to the automobile industry, the annual International Motor 
Exhibition in Britain provided a central, recurring point for programming on this second rich 
source for industrial pride, even if - and the realities raised earlier by Paul Kennedy and Brian 
Harrison do not feature - Britain’s place in car manufacturing was diminishing. The 1960 show 
is said to display the whole range of speed - ‘up to the 170 m.p.h. Aston Martin sports car’ - 
and luxury - the top end of that scale being ‘a £9,000 Rolls-Royce’.270 In 1967 The Giants 
offered portraits of Rolls-Royce and Imperial Chemical Industries, ‘to find out what makes 
them so successful in so many fields.’ Rolls-Royce, ‘whose very name has become a hallmark 
for quality and excellence all over the world’, apparently provided ‘the best car in the world.’271 
Rolls-Royce fell into difficulties over development costs and delays in a contract for Lockheed 
declared a ‘stupendous national victory’, with bankruptcy following in early 1969. Anthony 
Sampson considered it a ‘demonstration that this kind of high technology had outgrown the 
scope of medium-sized nations, and that projects of such extravagance, if attempted at all, 
needed both the backing and the market of a whole continent.’272 As for Imperial Chemical 
Industries, Walter Laqueur deemed it another example of British failure to forge ahead and 
compete with European counterparts, as Germany regained its dominance and French and 
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Italian firms developed at a rate even exceeding that. Neither the Rolls-Royce debacle nor the 
fact that I.P.I. itself relocated its plants to the Maas River featured in BBC programmes.273 
 
 Nevertheless, the identity of the British as Great Engineers – George and Robert 
Stephenson, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, Henry Boyce and Frank Whittle were adduced to 
prove that in one programme of the title – is beyond doubt in London Calling and the output it 
acts as a guide to.274 When reporting on the ‘national triumphs’ of the Monte Carlo Rally, in 
1960, it is stated that R.A.C. crews ‘will drive British cars, as, indeed, will many of the entrants 
from other countries.’275 And while Rolls-Royce is used to add a touch of class to the produce 
of British factories, and the hands of those operating the assembly lines, figures such as Sir 
Alec Issigonis often speak, sometimes personally, to the ingenuity and thrift one ought expect 
of Britain’s designers. As ‘unquestionably Britain’s leading car designer’, ‘acknowledged by 
the motor industry all over the world to be one of the few men whose concepts are changing 
the shape of the familiar passenger car’, the man behind the Morris Minor and Mini perfectly 
portrays the qualities that go along with quality.276 Issigonis is among the voices of The 
Carmakers who tell the ‘dramatic story of success’ in the Midlands, the listing of which makes 
sure to use a favourite adjective to describe the work of those minds at the British Motor 
Corporation and elsewhere: Britons are pioneering or, as in this case, have ‘pioneered’.277 
 
 Serving to underscore the previous point, The Plane-makers promised to go behind 
the curtain of an industry that Britain still had a right to rank itself alongside the U.S. in, charting 
fifty years of development through all-British ‘pioneers’ Geoffrey de Havilland, A. V. Roe and 
Frederick Handley Page. A ‘highly complex industry, geared to the production of an immensely 
complex refined high precision product’, it is presented as natural for Britain to have carved 
out a significant part of the market.278 Programmes with more mundanely worded listings such 
as Flight 950 and The Airline Pilots, looking respectively behind-the-scenes of London Airport 
and in the cockpit during one of its flights, still serve to show the precision of technicians and 
trailblazing of airmen taking to the skies in brand new, British-made Trident, Comet and BAC 
111 jets.279 In reality it was the American Boeing 707 that near monopolized world aviation; 
the Comet I could be seated aside the Magnox nuclear reactor as another ‘unprofitable’ 
flagship of national research and development, recalled due to three of the seven of its first 
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iteration spectacularly crashing within two years of 1952.280 A positive spin is instead provided 
by repeated press for the next big project: Concorde. In 1962 Research Project triumphantly 
declared that engineers from Handley Page and Bristol Aircraft were working on supersonic 
jets that could be brought into service ‘sooner than the American project’.281 In the same series 
British invention and innovation was again vocalised by John Keenan of Rolls-Royce, working 
on the propulsion system for an ‘aircraft which according to the calculations of the designers 
would be able to fly non-stop halfway round the world in a few hours.’282 Emblematic of the 
desired brand, opportunities are seized upon to print images of Concorde in London Calling 
and promote it within programmes on air.283 
 
 Extra to the British trinity of nuclear power, motoring and aircraft, astronomy provided 
a field of science, helpfully supportive of status amid the space race, with much of note to 
extensively promote. The chosen emblem here was undoubtedly the Jodrell Bank Radio 
Telescope, with its Director Bernard Lovell the symbol of the scientific community and its 
continuity of past accomplishments. A. C. B. Lovell was included as one of the Scientists at 
Home in a series of intimate interviews with professors and other practitioners; he speaks 
‘about the construction of the first major radio telescope and historic space shots’ as a guest 
of The Time of My Life; in an image accompanying the page on ‘Science, Industry and 
Commerce in the World Service’ in April 1968 is, as ought be expected, the Director in the 
control room of Jodrell Bank with his grand, 250-foot steel dish in the background.284 The 
mighty telescope, testament to both British brains and brawn, is a stock image for programmes 
on space themes, such as in the listing of April 1967 for documentary Man and the Universe.285 
And as with the name of Rolls-Royce and its connotations, Jodrell Bank is seemingly 
shoehorned in where possible in discussions of unrelated programmes. The Annual Meeting 
of the British Association for the Advancement of Science will, being held in Manchester, afford 
‘some of the most learned and eminent scholars of our time … the chance to visit the Jodrell 
Bank Radio Telescope in Cheshire’; more tangentially, an exploration of Sheffield goes into 
great depth about everywhere other than the city that its famed steel has been used, including 
Jodrell Bank with other projects that ‘cannot do without it.’286 
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 The reader of London Calling gets the incontrovertible sense, as it can be presumed 
the listener would too from the content broadcast, that the British are a technocratically-minded 
society disproportionately populated by scientists – all of whom rightly renowned. There is no 
sense of a ‘brain drain’ away from Britain which, real or not, was widely reported.287 On the 
occasion that Lord Hailsham appears on Asian Club among his posts the Minister for Science 
is listed, without elaboration, as being ‘a new appointment and an addition to the Cabinet.’288 
The novel ministry is afforded few words and the title of the talk, ‘On Being Oneself’, suggests 
it was neither at the heart of the Viscount Quintin Hogg’s concerns or the recorded 
conversation. This would only reflect the then reputation of the Ministry, an office in a house 
off of Whitehall with a barely functioning lift, which Sampson agreed with The Economist and 
civil servants was somewhere ‘between being a post-box, not often emptied, and having real 
influence.’289 Exploding the myth of a modern Britain run by ‘new men’ – sometimes women – 
is the driving point of Sampson’s Anatomy, revisited with renewed emphasis in the 1971 
edition. Puncturing the reality of an elite Establishment, he draws attention to the fact that 
Harold Macmillan’s cabinet largely consisted of the sons and son-in-laws of peers without 
technical qualification; Lord Hailsham is said to know ‘nothing about science’ and Reginald 
Maudling ‘had not been to Africa until two months before he became Colonial Secretary.’ This 
translated into Parliament - ‘which is confused and bored by science, as its sporadic scientific 
debates suggest’ – and upper society at large, where no newspaper editors and only two of 
22 permanent heads of government departments had scientific experience.290 This ‘rule by 
mediocracy’, dominated by familiar names from familiar schools, and all too familiar with one 
another, was also a central motif of the Suicide of a Nation writers.291 
 
 Given that the civil service and state departments were charged with making decisions 
and overseeing investments on national research and development, it stunned Sampson to 
find that even a technical ministry such as that for Aviation had on its board ‘not scientists or 
engineers, but “Latin and History scholars”.’ ‘The conditioned reflex of the civil service is still 
to imitate the action of a clam, and retire into its shell’ was his observation on witnessing what 
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was the resumption of a ‘mandarin profession’ after the war, with its ‘apartheid’ between 
experts and administrators.292 The Fulton Commission of 1968, directed by Harold Wilson in 
1966 to inquire as to civil service reform, simply echoed the same situation prevailing of 
‘muddle’ and ‘mandarins’,  the lingering obsolescence of the ‘generalist’ and lack of 
responsibilities for specialists.293 Interestingly Anatomy of Britain was included among books 
to be reviewed during the programme Talking of Books in 1962, a little time after its publication 
the previous year. The text is seated among numerous other ‘examinations of national 
conscience’ that a contemporary reader might find, as if merely a topic in vogue. The listing 
focuses on the critiques that prove his opinion, that Britain is run by those ‘more concerned 
with tradition than progress’, was ‘far from unanimous’.294 Nevertheless, it and Anthony 
Sampson himself do make appearances in General Overseas and World Service schedules. 
It also must be noted that programming does not resist the idea of a muddling bureaucracy 
behind government, although this is almost wholly presented through farce. One such comedy 
production was The Clerks, which told ‘of the beginning and end of the “Office of the Privy 
Council for the Redress of Grievance”; it is quickly added that such a department ‘did not really 
exist!’295 The long-running Men From the Ministry brought ‘incompetence, misunderstanding 
and red tape to a number of farcical situations, generated not a hundred miles from 
Whitehall.’296 
 
 Indeed, care and credit ought to be given to the number of opportunities given to 
dissenting voices such as Sampson. Richard Hoggart, most famously in his 1957 book Uses 
of Literacy, lamented the erosion of working-class traditions and authenticity by the 
massification of culture, especially its Americanisation, seeing modern consumerism as 
shallow, destructive and debased.297 Hoggart’s traditionalist dismay at the loss of character 
and individuality in his native Yorkshire, with ‘candy-floss’ supplanting the ‘rougher but more 
vital culture’ of his youth was fully aired in his appearance on Asian Club in 1960.298 Another 
literary commentator who feared the subversive influence of cheap, accessible American 
culture was Raymond Williams, Marxist and later Welsh nationalist, who speaks on The 
Meaning of Progress on Asian Club in 1961.299 The gist of his position is shown with reference 
to his latest book, The Long Revolution, in which massified culture is argued as another strand 
of the upheavals democratic and economic of the preceding century, and Williams ‘deplores 
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the divorce of cultural progress from political and industrial advance’. For the author of Culture 
and Society (1958), ‘low cultural and intellectual standards’ were counterposed with increasing 
living standards; classism and inequality still dominated an expanding education system of 
comprehensive schools and new universities; and the arts and media were debased by  
‘commercial interests.’300 Also noteworthy for his inclusion is Michael Shanks, Financial Times 
industrial editor and author of The Stagnant Society, an attack on a ‘Janus-faced’ Britain, never 
quite looking up or ahead with its trade unions holding it back, said in London Calling to have 
‘aroused much controversy’.301 The ABC of Economics promised to impart Shanks’ wisdom 
on the basic principles of economics behind such baffling phrases as ‘“Cost inflation”; “Balance 
of payments crisis”; “Wage spiral”’, ‘written with the needs of developing peoples in mind’.302 
Whether reference was made in the programme itself, there is no direct mention in the listing 
that Britain provided a case in point for all of these ills. 
 
 Further supporting the case that the BBC did in fact provide a ‘warts and all’ 
representation of Britain, albeit again with the asterisk that we do not have the audio recording 
or textual scripts for treatment, was a series of programmes entitled Life Among the British. 
The listing promised an exposition of life on the British Isles through contemporary novels by 
such ‘angry young men’ as Kingsley Amis and Alan Sillitoe, with the chosen texts reflecting a 
Britishness in public and private that was coarse, disconnected and cynical. Taking these 
thematically, three speak directly to the previous discussion of muddle versus modernity - 
scientific, technocratic and socially mobile. Charles Percy Snow’s Corridors of Power (1964) 
was the ninth book by the novelist and government advisor in his Strangers and Brothers 
series, following its main character over the course of a distinguished career - modelled on 
the author’s own - from provincial England through Cambridge University, becoming a senior 
civil servant after a wartime spent in Whitehall. A reviewer in Science magazine placed Snow 
among the ‘Establishment’, part of the country house and members club circuit in which power 
was exercised. ‘Snow is too concerned with showing how the status quo works to criticize it’; 
the story, whilst an insightful account by an ‘insider’, is not one of ‘good chaps’ or ‘bad 
chaps’.303 It is then more a manual to the facts of power than a manifesto for its redistribution.  
 
William Cooper’s Memoirs of a New Man (1966) is much to the same effect, himself ‘part of 
the throng of early 20th-century scholarship boys from relatively modest backgrounds who 
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went on to staff the postwar university common rooms and research labs.’304 Cooper was also 
a close compatriot of Snow.305 A reviewer in Nature predicted the same ‘in group’ approach 
would not give the novel any ‘wide appeal’; nor was it a riveting read, since the scientists who 
‘fight their way to the top in a more urbane fashion than arts men’ are shown having now ‘all 
got their K's.’306 The ‘new men’ of these texts are made men, ‘red-brick scientists’ whose 
aspirations for power have been met, if not without certain bureaucratic conflict. Coming closer 
to a refutation of the narrow, windowless corridors in which power circulated, or even 
conspired, is The Hollow Sunday (1967) by Robert Harling. As a synopsis, it chronicles the 
birth pangs of a ‘new technology’ Sunday paper coupled with an investigation of a major 
political scandal involving an M.P.'s wife, in which the editor, his gossip columnist, the new 
Minister, and a Life Peer involved in the affair all know each other from college. This can be 
read as reproval of a society run by cliques and a currency in salacious secrets; sordid and 
most definitely not meritocratic.  
 
However, a different impression is given in the speech of one character on the very episode 
that was the book’s obvious inspiration. The affair and subsequent perjury in 1963 of John 
Profumo, Macmillan’s Secretary of State for War, and Christine Keeler, also familiar to a Soviet 
naval attache, ‘had all the ingredients of a sensation’ and, predictably, became one. The 
scandal ‘undermined conservative attempts to contain postwar affluence within a prewar moral 
framework’, causing resentment of an elite who had posited the behaviour of ordinary citizens 
as the reason for decline.307 Harold Wilson, then Opposition Leader, took advantage of such 
a totem to Establishment amateurism, with the £60 million security services being beaten to 
the punch by the News of the World: ‘What we are seeing is a diseased excrescence, a 
corrupted and poisoned appendix of a small and unrepresentative section of society that 
makes no contribution to what Britain is’.308 The crisis and its assorted intrigues had the lasting 
effect of giving profile to public concerns over ‘espionage and subversion, sexual wantonness, 
unchecked materialism … and the nepotism and ineptitude of the Conservative 
government.’309 Harling’s character, while rehearsing the tawdry story for his reader refers to 
it rather as ‘ballyhoo’ by the public and press over what was merely a ‘lark’. It is argued that 
all politicians lie, even the irreproachable Winston Churchill, ‘Bare-faced’ but ‘forgotten within 
a month’; it was simply ‘sexual envy … that set all the moralizing hypocritical hounds 
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baying.’310 A breach of public confidence and high office is thus minimised - indeed normalised 
- although not all to the benefit of the propriety of Britishness.311 The Profumo Affair, unless 
mentioned in news bulletins would have been otherwise unknown to those who tuned in to the 
World Service, even then assuming such a link between the scandals both real and fictional 
was made.  
  
 Class is a major theme of the selected texts, be it the coterie of the upper echelons, a 
crowded and conflicted middle, or the continued want of the bottom. It should be remembered 
that at the start of the sixties it was widely considered, at least among those with advantages 
by no means universal, that Britain was evolving beyond caste and socioeconomic exclusion. 
The election victory of the Conservatives under Macmillan in 1959 spurred the incumbent 
Prime Minister to declare ‘the class war is over and we have won it.’ On the other side of the 
House, Labour under Hugh Gaitskell contemplated removing Clause Four on public ownership 
and even changing the name of the party to ‘Reform’; then Shadow Home Secretary Patrick 
Gordon Walker believed Labour faced oblivion if it remained bound to a working class that ‘no 
longer exists.’312 Looking at the programming of 1960 in London Calling, a whiggish belief in 
the future that confined class conflict to Marxist historiography is substantiated – if imperfect, 
Britain is undeniably, irreversibly progressing. The magazine sends out the same sure signal 
as did ‘The new thinking’, inaugural Sun newspaper in 1964: ‘People believe, and the Sun 
believes with them, that the division of Britain into social classes is happily out of date.’313 A 
Cheshire mule spinner recollects a ‘vanished age’ of holidays in Morecambe, mills without 
canteens, local football, strong Methodism and a terraced house ‘nearly a century old’ as 
modern engineering replaces ‘the boom and depression cycle of the cotton trade’.314 A miner’s 
daughter from south Wales speaks of the ‘solidarity and community feeling’ typical of 
segregated parts of the country, surviving in spite of new light industries giving the younger 
generation a ‘choice of occupations at the end of their schooldays.’315 The York Summer 
Festival is celebrated through interviews with ‘industrialists and prominent citizens’ in the 
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‘flourishing and progressive’ city once infamous for slums, of which the second Rowntree 
Report showed how ‘dramatically conditions had changed.’316  
 
 Life Among the British does not give the impression, however, that Britain had 
graduated from the strife and ostracism of class, or was arguably even on such a trajectory. 
The Village (1966) of Thomas Hinde’s novel, in the words of the Spectator’s Peter Vansittart, 
is depicted through its native ‘Resistance’, battling against ‘the district surveyor, compulsory 
purchase, chemical sprays’ as they are threatened by ‘demolition and flooding, doubtless so 
that commuters elsewhere can strain more quickly at jobs of questionable value.’ These are 
no sunlit uplands and absorption into London’s orbit does not promise any better, while the 
characters, ‘feuding amid social climbs and falls’ are, ‘in or out of fiction, scarcely unfamiliar.’317 
The Second Generation Raymond Williams’ wrote of is that which has risen through 
educational opportunity from working class roots above that social strata; characters are torn 
between family and new-found freedom, university socialism and that of the shop floor.318 
Williams himself was the son of a railwayman who became instrumental to the liberal and 
intellectual New Left, openly critical of Harold Wilson’s calculated pragmatism but never much 
recognised or accepted by the working class they supposed themselves to be the true 
advocates - and emancipators - of.319 Contrary to the concerns of Williams – and Hoggart – 
that working class culture was being decimated by the homogenising force of massification, 
the heterogeneity of the North is shown to survive in This Sporting Life (1960).320 David Storey 
portrays the ruthless world of Rugby League, be it ‘nasty southern caricature’ or celebration 
of ‘Northern masculinity’, through the novel’s pathological anti-hero who uses the sport as ‘a 
means of transcending the drab, meager existence he sees awaiting him.’ Splintering from the 
more regimented public school Rugby Union, League was itself symbolic of the North’s defiant 
individuality in resistance to the South.321 
 
 The fifties and sixties literary scene was full of representations of a cross-section of 
society believing neither in progressive nor participatory agendas; those left behind and many 
others staying put, resistant to change and a future of permissiveness, globalism, socialism, 
or even a common good. Writers of the so-called - corralled according to Kingsley Amis - 
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Movement and New Wave explored such people and their stories, and are significant for their 
inclusion in Life Among the British. Collectively branded the ‘angry young men’, these authors 
frequently took readers on a tour of ‘the world of Northern terraces, poverty and violence … 
aggressive attitudes to sex and women; a deep suspicion of modernity and mass culture; 
intense cultural nativism; a persistent strain of nostalgia, particularly for the Edwardian period; 
and a curious combination of indeterminate anger and political apathy.’322 One character in 
Amis’ Take a Girl like You (1960) may show some decency and optimistic sense in saying  
 
A great British prime minister once remarked that the people were divided into 
two nations, the rich and the poor, and in effect that these had no knowledge 
of each other. One might say the same, perhaps, of those who live in parts of 
the world where segregation by races is practised. But these barriers, or the 
reasons for them, belong to a part of our history which is fortunately passing 
away.323 
 
But it is the brazenly repugnant narcissism of the main character, an extreme of the likewise 
slovenly and selfish lead of Lucky Jim, that leaves the lasting impression. Alan Sillitoe’s 
Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (1951) was described in the publicity for its film 
adaptation (1960) as the story of ‘a convention-smashing, working-class Don Juan, who works 
as a machine operator, and revolts against the squalor and monotony of life in a grimy 
Midlands’ suburb by living louder and faster than everyone else.’ Its lead, self-absorbed and 
anti-establishment, rejects the idea of fighting alongside Germans against Russia or thinking 
of the world at all, British or otherwise.324 The Ken Loach-directed docudrama Cathy Come 
Home sought to expose the destitution of an underclass forgotten in Welfare Britain and, 
according to the Guardian, showed the country to be both ‘heedless’ and ‘heartless’.325 
 
 For Richard Weight, the sixties entailed neither embourgeoisement nor 
proletarianization but rather ‘an unprecedented dialogue between the classes’ that 
engendered greater pluralism in British culture.326 This was evidenced in such breakthrough 
literature and film as that which the BBC World Service chose to represent Life Among the 
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British. But the programming presented not only this conversation but also mobility within 
society, new men providing the bright and vital sparks for the ‘White Heat’ of a modern, 
competitive Britain. Anthony Sampson saw somnolence and ‘a desperate rearguard action 
against a more professional and less complacent age’ when writing at the start of the decade; 
at its end he remarked on a ‘striking scene-change’ whereby industrialists had become 
household names, their heroic exploits and ingenious machines widely pronounced.327 
Buccaneering tycoons were seen battling for their companies and to save the nation from 
‘unscrupulous sheikhs, witch-hunting Americans or corrupt continentals’ in such television 
serials as The Troubleshooters. There was clearly an appetite for promoting a more 
businesslike Britain, even if – or because – it could be fretted from the nation’s persistently 
low growth-rate that the British did not ‘want to grow faster’ out of a ‘basic unambition.’328 
 
 The impression given by the BBC in its programming is certainly not of a nation prone 
to sloth or without aspiration; successful businessmen commonly feature, unconstrained by 
glass ceilings and unquestionable in their achievements. ‘Starting from Scratch’ is the headline 
in London Calling for a feature series in which ‘captains of industry’ coach listeners on How to 
Make a Fortune, striving from ‘humble beginnings’ to become ‘the man who deals in 
millions’.329 The graft of ‘The man who has worked his way up from the factory floor to the 
board-room’ was evidenced in the reflections for As I See It of Sir Frederic Hooper, who ‘after 
the First World War took up a lowly position with one of the country’s leading department 
stores. Twelve years later he was managing director.’330 ‘Kenneth Horne’s boyhood ambition 
was to own a Rolls-Royce’, it is said in the listing for an interview with the career company 
director - and BBC radio comedian - who made good of his goals upon owning one, ‘chauffeur-
driven and bearing on its number plate the distinctive symbols KH6’.331 The Chief Executive 
(September 1969) remained a favoured subject of programmes throughout the decade, with 
‘leaders of British industry’ punctuating schedules to the effect of reinforcing and raising the 
profile of both their corporate brands and that of Britishness.332 A full-page marking the death 
of William Morris and a programme in tribute of the philanthropic motor magnate, in 1963, is 
the perfect portrayal of the British businessman and his place in BBC content. Morris presents 
a story of cycle repair rags, starting his shop ‘with a capital of £4’, to ‘princely munificence’ in 
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his Nuffield Foundation from the riches of Morris Motors; a man of ‘ability and brilliance’ and 
benefactor of the ‘small man’ whose ‘generosity was not confined to Britain.’333 The traits of 
this paragon are threaded through London Calling listings of others, making him the exemplar 
of a brand continually bolstered. 
 
 Another element of this case for Britons as strivers in the vanguard is the rise of youth, 
venerated for its vigour and invention not only in popular music. In 1962 a typical programme, 
part of a feature series that made a survey of Inside Britain, rounded up this Rising Generation. 
The episode did not pull the punches aimed at ‘youth’s irresponsibility’ and ‘materialism’, 
condemning ‘its morals, or absence of them, and its lack of purpose’, giving voice to critics 
who believed that social security and consumerism ‘have made life since the war too secure 
and easy.’ In this ‘nation of tomorrow … are the future prospects of the nation itself.’334 Fears 
of the teenager, appearing well founded in the deviancy of ‘Teddy Boy’ gangs feverishly 
reported in the domestic press, are fast surmounted when the British entertainment and 
fashion industries came of age through adolescents who are shown to secure those prospects. 
Jane Deverson and Charles Hamblett’s Generation X, be they demonised Mods or ‘self-
consciously proletarian and thuggish’ skinheads, are footnotes at first and then quickly 
forgotten in BBC schedules that consciously champion the Beatles and other personalities on 
brand with British pioneering.335 ‘Britain’s, if not the world’s, top beat group’ make their 
entrance in the General Overseas Service in 1964 with Pop Go the Beatles, a series compiling 
their appearances on the BBC including the domestic radio show of the same title they 
hosted.336 Despite their virtually unassailable popularity, the Liverpool group had detractors 
who crowned them as false idols of a ‘rampant sexuality and soulless commercialism.’337 On 
the other hand, while recognising the dubiousness of the musicians’ MBEs, the New Musical 
Express printed a commonplace argument that the Beatles had done more than ‘a regiment 
of diplomats’ to ‘keep the Union Jack fluttering proudly’; with them this ‘second-rate class 
power in politics’ could nevertheless lead in ‘the field of prestige’.338 The BBC firmly dealt from 
the latter hand. 
 
 As the General Overseas Service turned into the World Service, London Calling used 
‘The Pop Scene’ - its own discrete section in the magazine - to project a British identity as 
industrious and innovative as generations before, the recording and art studio substituted for 
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the workshop; the fashion house for the factory in ‘this fast-changing world, where Britain now 
sets the pace’.339 It is made clear that ‘British ideas and artists, and by no means only the 
Beatles, are predominant.’340 The listing for an investigation of London Fashion references ‘A 
recent survey conducted in three capitals [showing] that London has completely overtaken 
Paris and New York as the world’s fashion centre’, proving this point through interviews with 
such instigators as Mary Quant and John Stephens.341 The Young Idea became increasingly 
integral to representations of Britishness as the World Service developed through its first five 
years, complimenting the image of Britain as the world’s library and lab with creative vitality 
and vogue.342 This is seen to crystallise in one programme of particular aptness called Cool 
Britannia, ‘sparked off by a BBC World Service correspondent who signed himself “American 
Teenager” and asked for a programme which told teenagers throughout the world about the 
music, dress, etc., of British teenagers.’ Telling of the whole presentation of ‘Pop’ and the 
editorial purpose of it is a spot in this new regular programme, starting in January 1969, named 
‘We’re Backing Britain’.343 ‘I’m Backing Britain’ was the rallying slogan of an initiative of five 
typists in Surbiton, who voluntarily gave up their tea breaks to help increase productivity and 
inspired a spontaneous, nationwide campaign; Harold Wilson and his Conservative 
counterpart Edward Heath seized on their ‘spirit’ to silence those ‘knocking’ Britain from within 
and without.344 Riffing on this popular if ephemeral campaign, Britons of global stardom are 
placed in a succession of patriots who have served and spread British civilisation. They are 
the emphatic icons of a nation with a cause and the character to meet it. Culture can join 
science and industry as another of the revolutions in which Britain is centre of the world map. 
 
Commonwealth and race, internationalism and insularity 
 
Equally important to marketing a nation is the market, meaning that representations need not 
only persuade for the special place, privileges and genius of a people in its past and present, 
but also why it ought to hold influence with and the appeal of others. In any period, the labels 
of racism and insularity are plainly poor branding; in this specific decade, Britain was still 
invested in and dependent on a Commonwealth of Nations that was multi-cultural and multi-
racial, because of which becoming increasingly cosmopolitan at home and internationalist 
abroad. The identity presented of Britain by the BBC sought to, as shall be discussed, 
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reconcile this position with evidence to the contrary of its acceptance among Britons. What we 
do find, however, is that as the political significance of the British Commonwealth waned and 
the official view became less far-sighted about Britain’s future in it, the World Service from 
1965 gradual phased out the institution in favour of a broader, less ‘British’ focus. The brief 
behind the World Service had always openly been for ‘encouraging the Englishman to realise 
that he is part of a new kind of commonwealth’, taking ‘full cognisance of English-speaking but 
foreign native audiences.’ What is remarkable, to use Gerard Mansell’s recollection, is how 
this ‘international flavour was creeping in’ and reconstructing for Britain an image ‘more in tune 
with the spirit of the times’, a ‘disinterested’  power now ‘a purveyor of truth and a source of 
practical wisdom’, in correlation with the severing of British political and economic ties with its 
Commonwealth.345 
 
 In 1961, the director-general of the Commonwealth Festival, Ian Hunter, previews the 
event designed to forge an artistic community that will compliment ties recognised in such 
other areas as commerce and sport; aims, it can be said, ‘which in many ways are similar to 
those of the BBC’s General Overseas Service’.346 When the event finally takes place after 
several years of planning in 1965, R. E. Gregson, who had recently orchestrated the change 
to a World Service as its Head, still could muse how schedules could reflect ‘The gaiety, beauty 
and richness of a most talented invasion’ when every day is something of a Commonwealth 
Arts Festival for us.’347 In reality, while the Commonwealth did remain, whether by affection or 
affectation of it, it had by 1965 become residual. In December 1964, Commonwealth Carnival 
put on its own selection of talent from the British world for a Christmas special, but whereas 
such themed feature programmes and strands were prolific earlier in the sixties this stands 
out as singular in its schedule.348 Commonwealth Day continues to be celebrated through a 
half-hour programme, first produced by Radio Malaysia in 1966, but Quiz International is 
reflective of a how the ‘Commonwealth’ is no longer explicit or exclaimed in programmes: 
teams are made up of citizens from Ceylon, Guyana, Hong Kong, the West Indies, all of whom 
working for British companies, but the title should not be read simply as a misnomer.349 As a 
1969 survey by New Society found, when asking a representative sample of demography and 
politics to reflect on the decade, it was certainly right for a national broadcaster seeking to 
reflect its nation to shed the mantle it had inherited from the Empire Service: 2 per cent and 5 
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per cent respectively considered being ‘centre of the Commonwealth’ or ‘traditions and history’ 
to be the most important thing about Britain.350  
 
 As discussed in chapter two, this did not mean that Britons in the sixties did not feel 
themselves connected with or tied to the Commonwealth, at least when compared with 
sentiments toward Europe or the United States. BBC programmes marking the occasions of 
Commonwealth countries did, however, give an exaggerated if not false impression of British 
interest. Taking 1960 as an example, Calling Ghana conveys the messages of Ghanaians 
resident in Britain to their countrymen in commemoration of their independence; the 10th 
anniversary of independent India brings the sounds of Raga music on Republic Day; Music 
from Trinidad scores celebrations of Caribbean Federation Day; a collaborative programme 
with the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation on the granting of nationhood explores ‘the history 
and culture of the country, its people and resources’.351 Acting as a venue for festivities, the 
BBC presented Britain as the gleeful giver of liberty and granter of freedom; the British are on 
the side of the picket line with the protestors, rather than inside the factory which they are the 
foremen of. According to Lawrence James, ‘It is hard nowadays to comprehend the optimism 
which attended the gradual granting of independence to Britain’s African colonies during the 
early 1960s.’ If so, then perhaps the ‘carnival atmosphere’ of BBC broadcasts were credible. 
However, James contradicts this when stating that ‘the mass of British voters were largely 
indifferent to the loss of colonies whose names were probably best known by stamp 
collectors.’352 Unless Britons were simply jubilant to be rid of their imperial possessions and 
the subject peoples therein, it is hard to see how supposed goodwill and apparent ignorance 
can otherwise combine.  
 
 The apathy of average Britons toward Empire and Commonwealth is widely evidenced 
in historiography of this period and, indeed, the decades preceding it. While ‘ignorance does 
not necessarily indicate indifference’ – many cannot name their local M.P., as Richard Weight 
analogises, but are not impassive about parliamentary democracy – the facts of it are telling, 
especially given ‘more than half a century of imperial propaganda’. Even in the aftermath of 
the Second World War and Indian independence, vastly significant events in the 
Commonwealth community, half of Britons could not name one imperial possession and, more 
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worryingly, 3 per cent believed the United States still to be a colony.353 At the turn of the sixties, 
an initiative was begun, the Commonwealth Weeks, which was far more to do with inspiring 
interest than serving it. As to be expected, the BBC promoted the show as it circulated from 
city to city around Britain with great fanfare, asking readers of London Calling to ‘recall the 
popularity of the first week in Liverpool’ as a sign of its treatment.354 It is proudly reflected in 
the BBC Handbook 1961 that aside the ‘significant opportunity’ afforded the General Overseas 
Service by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference to cover such themes, ‘special 
effort’ had been made ‘to reflect and support the Commonwealth Weeks' venture’.355 Writing 
of the initiative as Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘with typically British understatement’, 
Duncan Sandys would regret it had not ‘attracted continuous and enthusiastic support’ – 
Weight calls it ‘a dismal failure.’ That same year, 1962, ‘the Empire Day Movement accepted 
that a revival was impossible and formally dissolved itself after fifty-nine years of activity.’356 
This suggests that there was nothing revelatory about New Society’s uncovering of how far 
from British hearts the Commonwealth was, even if Britain remained at its centre; news 
nonetheless to any Commonwealth listener of the BBC.  
 
 On the other side of magnanimous grants of independence and accession of new 
nations into a Commonwealth of equals, as the BBC’s telling of the story of decolonisation 
goes, the sixties also saw acrimony and conflict between Britain and its subjects. ‘Just as they 
found in Tanganyika and Uganda’, John Darwin writes, ‘the British discovered in Kenya that 
the offer of internal self-government was a run-away train that refused to stop at the stations 
they built or to pick up the passengers they meant it to carry.’357 The ‘peasant jacquerie’ of the 
Kikuyu during the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, leading to over 150,000 detained in a ‘savage 
and one-sided’ suppression between 1952-56, is an exception that proves the rule for its 
inclusion in programming. This ‘bloodshed in Kenya’ forms part of the Scrapbook for 1952, 
albeit before the worst of British recriminations occurred.358 Broadcast before the Kenya 
Constitutional Conference in London of 1962, Signposts in Kenya remembered the Mau Mau 
while focusing on the ‘boom’, equal ‘if not surpassing that of any other country’, experienced 
since their quelling. It is a land of tribes said only to have been brought together by the Kenya-
Uganda railway, owing its present economy to ‘the 3,000 white farmers’ with whom they must 
‘bridge their internal differences.’359 Even so framed, this is volumes compared to the silence 
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regarding similar confrontations during colonial withdrawal. There is no mention at all of the 
far more recent and, indeed, continuing crisis in what would become Malawi, then federated 
under the white rule of Rhodesia. Censorship and the death of demonstrators led an inquiry 
chaired by Lord Devlin to condemn a state of emergency declared in Nyasaland as the 
creation of a ‘police state’. The racialist M.P. Enoch Powell, whom we shall return to in depth, 
is remembered for a famous attack on those for whom British standards only applied in Britain: 
‘All Government, all influence of man upon man, rests on opinion.’360 Clearly, what is not 
spoken of does not require any manufacturing of opinion.  
 
 The Reith Lectures, annually inviting an academic to give a series of talks in honour of 
the BBC’s founding Director-General, while produced for the domestic services did provide 
world audiences with more involved appraisals of contemporary problems by their 
rebroadcast. One such by Margery Perham concerned The Colonial Reckoning, listed in 
London Calling as ‘an assessment of the ending of British rule in Africa and of the forces which 
are replacing it’ from the perspective of Britain, ‘who has the first right to answer the general 
anti-colonial charge.’361 In the text of the lectures, regularly urging caution against perfidious 
Communism, there is a clear reservation for the role of the anti-colonial movement: ‘It 
condemns our past record, it weakens our present influence. It also threatens to harm our 
future relations with many of our former subjects and other coloured peoples.’ Perham is 
straightforward in her apology for the British Empire, believing its record ‘to have been 
misjudged, and misleading tests applied to it’; Britain ought to be judged by a long human 
history in which imperialism ‘has been taken for granted as part of the established order.’ The 
question arising from these novel political and moral demands is ‘where, we must ask, were 
these new standards derived?’ National consciousness and notions of self-determination 
were, Perham lectures, ‘purloined from the West’ and ‘learned very largely from Britain 
herself.’362 Historically valid or not, these Reith Lectures, existing as they did in a near vacuum 
of serious coverage of decolonisation, concretely advances the identity of the British as 
civilizers who have inherited imperialism only to bequeath emancipation.363 
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 Elsewhere, other programmes substantiate this progressive history of British 
imperialism. The Family of Nations was a series charting the development of the 
Commonwealth, with a choice of figures that underpinned its purposeful, principled narrative. 
The Earl of Durham in 1840 recommends for Canada its own ‘responsible government based 
on the British constitution’; the ‘illustrious prose’ of ‘the great Whig historian’ Lord Macaulay 
on the Crown’s acquisition of East India Company holdings in 1833, ‘dealt with one of the 
noblest causes of his time - the advancement of India’; while fighting ‘valiantly against Britain’ 
in the Boer War, Jan Christiaan Smuts helped ‘dispel the legacy of bitterness’ by his actions 
in the First and Second World Wars; Lord Attlee saw his ‘proudest memories’ in the 
independence of India, Pakistan and Ceylon.’364 It would have been understandable for the 
listener of the BBC External Services believe from its programmes that the British acquired 
their Empire merely by drawing maps from their explorations; representations of Britons from 
imperial sunrise to high noon are as adventurers and missionaries, not conquerors. Illustrative 
as an example is One Man’s Journey, which told the tales of several dauntless Britons who 
boldly went, Bible in hand, when none had before. There is Michael Symes, who was 
eventually accepted with ‘kindness’ into the royal court of Rangoon in 1795, after showing ‘tact 
and forbearance to the initial rebuffs he met’; Thomas Manning, ‘the first Englishman to 
penetrate Tibet as far as the then hidden city of Lhasa’, one of the ‘principle expounders’ of 
‘Tibetology’ if such a science existed; Bishop Heber of Calcutta, who ‘held the Hindu faith in 
great respect’, along with the peoples and customs of India.365 
 
 British identity is similarly infused with higher morality and purpose by more modern 
luminaries featured across BBC programming; their charitable internationalism is substituted 
for civilizing imperialism. Guests of Asian Club in 1960, in which a studio audience of Asians 
living in Britain asked questions of a given interviewee, included one of the ‘originators of the 
idea of a “World Refugee Year”’, Christopher Chataway; the Deputy Director-General of the 
International Refugee Organisation, Sir Arthur Rocker, who ensured that the resettlement 
required of the ‘world’s conscience’ became U.N. resolution in 1958 also appeared.366 An 
appreciation of wider British philanthropy and humanitarianism is given by copious coverage 
of the ‘international schemes of co-operation’ born of Britain, following the example of ‘man’s 
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help for man’ set by the Red Cross and others. Experts working in aid are often followed on 
their placements and secondments around the world, such as the medical doctors and plant 
nutritionists and architects observed in Meeting Ground, joined by an Oxford student who has 
‘helped the Amerindians to form a council amongst themselves to run their own community… 
to build a wharf, improve their cattle pasture, and construct new houses, and he had planned 
a complete new system of roads and drainage.’367 
 
 The model student in question, Colin Henfrey, was dispatched to British Guiana as one 
of the first cohort of young Britons with Voluntary Service Overseas. This secular aid 
organisation, launched in 1958 by Alec Dickson and Launcelot Fleming, utilised the same 
‘powerful combination of guilt and idealism’ as Victorian missions. Initial enthusiasm for the 
Commonwealth project and such voluntarism ‘chimed in with widespread British optimism 
about overseas aid.’368 Voluntary Service Overseas was certainly an asset for the BBC in 
presenting this moral impulse in British identity, for instance furnishing an appropriate image 
of a young, white woman teaching black children for the front cover of London Calling in March 
1965, leading ‘International Co-operation Year’ by example.369 It also helped that the listing for 
a documentary on the Service could remind the reader that it ‘ante-dates President Kennedy’s 
Peace Corps.’370 Britain is positioned, as previously noted of investment and involvement in 
international bodies, in the vanguard of voluntarism, aid and assistance. The Colombo Plan 
for economic development in Asia, created by Ernest Bevin in 1951 after a meeting of 
Commonwealth ministers, is described in a 10th anniversary programme as the ‘nursery of 
international understanding’ that has since welcomed to its cause the contributions of the 
United States and Japan.371 Sandbrook considers internationalism to be ‘overstated’ in 
accounts of sixties Britain, pointing to indifference about colonial deployments and the, in 
reality, underwhelming and ephemeral activism of 1968.372 Writing in 1967, Herbert Wiseman 
agreed with the charge that ‘the present Commonwealth ceased to be a British family of 
nations’ when Britons chose ‘to disown it, even if a little reluctantly.’373 Their knowledge of the 
world is based ‘on rumours, half-truths, or prejudice’ and, while being the figurehead of a 
‘fantasy Empire’ had consoled them, ‘there is great relief when, momentarily, a gunboat is 
used again.’ 
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 A false impression of British internationalism given by BBC programming is perhaps 
excusable for the fact that such coverage was often warranted and would naturally reflect a 
certain type of person, empathetic and educated about the world; the illiterate understandably 
do not appear in programmes on British writing, but the producer has not chosen his subjects, 
e.g. William Wordsworth, so as to mislead the audience into imagining all Britons to be 
wordsmiths. However, repetition creates a pattern. Concerning insularity, immigration 
presented a greater chance, in theory, for the BBC to illuminate its listeners about Britishness 
through Britons in ‘Blighty’. A documentary of 1962 entitled The Immigrants sought to answer 
whether ‘our reputed insularity’ had been ‘confirmed or transformed by more direct contact 
with others?’ The listing regarded ‘epithets of distaste’ for the ‘new Britons’ as ‘relatively 
superficial reactions’, weaving ‘modern settlers’ from across the Commonwealth into its 
narrative of a nation built by ‘as great a variety of peoples as any other land-mass in the 
world’.375 In 1966, The Newcomers explored the continuity of current immigration as ‘no new 
phenomenon. It is as old as the country itself.’376 As Professor of Sociology Michael Banton 
concluded in New Society in 1967, it was common of earlier analyses to suppose from past 
experience that immigrants of colour were assimilable, ‘even if it took longer for them than it 
had for Huguenots, Jews and Irish’; but regardless of whether ‘Jamaicans have more in 
common with the British than with the Pakistanis’, the crude distinction of complexion and not 
culture would matter most. As Brian Harrison sees in the 1958 Notting Hill race riots and 
Carnival that followed – neither referenced in London Calling – British ‘lumpers’ corralled 
immigrants, initially amorphous ‘splitters’ as cautious of other groups as Britons of them, into 
categories that actually ‘manufactured the ethnic solidarity they claimed to fear.’377  
 
 Identities based on colour were thus constructed in Britain, rather than brought to it. 
Groups banded and were blended together after arrival, their preconceived and often quite 
orthodox Britishness made into discrete denominations that increasingly decoupled with the 
mainstream. The idea that these ‘new settlers’ were ‘strangers’ still, regardless of speaking 
the same language and following similar customs, no less being known through centuries of 
shared history, was prevalent. But whereas it was not necessarily novel for immigrants from 
the Commonwealth to be thought of by what they were not, in relation to normative Britishness, 
and as ‘bottom of the social hierarchy whose presence is linked with trouble of one kind or 
another’, their assimilation did not proceed comparably to their predecessors, or 
contemporaries, from Europe. Keith Robbins finds that Europeans did not encounter ‘undue 
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difficulty’ in ‘becoming British’ and could maintain foreign heritages that were not held to be 
mutually exclusive with Britishness.378 While What the Poles Have Done for You helped 
smooth the settlement of Polish emigres, no similar leaflet was circulated to Britons fearful of 
black and Asian miscegenation that convinced of any shared civilisation with New 
Commonwealth arrivals.379 While a general xenophobia meant Germans and Jews did not fare 
much better, eight in ten Britons rejected the idea of having a West Indian son-in-law and 
almost four in ten as a neighbour or friend.380 
 
 While the reader of London Calling and, it is taken, the listener of the BBC External 
Services is not given the impression that Britishness does or can include black or Asian 
identities, given no ‘British’ person of colour makes an appearance, Britain is nonetheless 
taken to be a place of ‘tolerance and humanity’ for all – at odds with leaflets for arrivals such 
as the Ministry of Labour’s How to Adjust Yourself in Britain that warned them to expect 
housing discrimination.381 When one looks at images of the BBC’s own black and Asian 
correspondents happily going about their business of reporting in Britain, demonstrating ‘how 
fundamentally alike all people are, even though they may live at opposite ends of the earth’, it 
is suggestive that such a disposition and welcoming receptivity is representative.382 The 
inhabitants of the village of Greyshott are said to have been respectfully ‘intrigued’ by the 
arrival of black reporters, pictured on a leafy street ‘armed with microphones and midget tape 
recorders’, on a Commonwealth trainee scheme – without any hint of euphemism.383 Richard 
Weight contends that the ideal of a Commonwealth, multi-racial yet mutual, ultimately 
depended on proximity and permanence. In essence, ‘the inclusivity of Britishness depended 
on the remoteness of the Queen’s coloured subjects from the UK.’ The ceremonial 
performance of multi-cultural identity and common traditions on Royal tours bore no 
resemblance to a very common monocultural identity at home; in reality it was a charm 
offensive that reaffirmed the rightful order of things, in their right place.384 Earlier in the sixties 
the only immigrant appearing in programmes adheres to this fundamental structure, such as 
the Jamaican working in Birmingham for the money to marry his Girl in Kingston Town.385 The 
Commonwealth Day programme of 1961 interviewed various citizens in Britain, gauging ‘how 
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they see their experience here in terms of what it can do for them and their countries when 
they go back.’386 
 
 The contentious issue of immigration into Britain is not entirely avoided by the BBC in 
its General Overseas and World Service broadcasting, however in titling one such programme 
Our Vital Immigrants it answers the question of whether such ‘brain and brawn’ is ‘offset by 
adverse effects in other directions?’.387 The controls on immigration set by both Conservative 
and Labour governments in this period, however, told a different story that, in spite of the 
landmark significance of both Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, goes unmentioned in London 
Calling. As with other omissions, it may be presumed that it was discussed in news bulletins 
and current affairs programming, but did not receive treatment in any dedicated, specific 
programme. It was an open secret at the time of the 1962 Act that the restrictions would in 
effect set a colour bar, something the Home Secretary R. A. Butler privately accepted as its 
design, and two thirds of Britons polled supported such a discriminatory curb.388 And while the 
passing of the second Act in 1968 revived for many the same ‘disgust not only for the 
government, or the political party that comprised that government, but for Britain’ which they 
had felt during the Suez Crisis, as many as three quarters of the population were claimed by 
the Government to back it. It was believed that a majority of ‘uncommitted racialists’ and 
‘millions of Alf Garnetts’ meant Britain remained, inescapably, ‘deeply race-prejudiced’.389 
Indeed, this belief that ‘Casual racism was present at all levels of British society in the sixties’ 
was borne out in in poll after poll, and the Financial Times were not alone in seeing in Alf 
Garnett, the bigoted lead of Till Death Do Us Part, ‘everything most hateful about our national 
character – xenophobic, illiberal, racist, anti-semitic, toadying, authoritarian.’390 The 
enormously successful television series was, for Richard Weight, ‘a brave attempt to confront 
a controversial’ – and correct – ‘aspect of Englishness which many people would have 
preferred to ignore.’391 The preference of the BBC, evidently, was just that. 
 
 Two surveys by New Society, one of ‘The nation’s mood’ in advance of the 1964 
election and the other looking back on the decade from the end of 1969, are insightful of the 
changes and continuities of thought in Britain and a growing consensus on the ‘Other’. While 
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the results of a Gallup poll preceding the 1964 survey had found that around half of Britons 
were dissatisfied with Britain’s position and wished it to remain a great power, four of five 
respondents to New Society ranked ‘individual happiness’ above ‘national greatness’. A 
retreat from imperial duty and a global role into domesticity in a Little, if not lesser, England 
appeared complete. At the time of polling the nation was almost equally split on whether 
‘unrestricted immigration’ into this personal paradise was ‘Consistent with the kind of Britain 
you want’.392 From the perspective of 1969, only the moral affront of permissiveness in ‘easier 
laws for homosexuality, divorce, abortion, etc’ was more objectionable than immigration. 
Proving official speculations on support for controls in 1968, 73 per cent considered there to 
be ‘too many coloured immigrants in the country now’.393 Such prejudice was dealt with 
sparingly and in isolation by programmes on the BBC External Services. When the more 
candid stories of immigrants are explored, it is interesting that the idea of them as ‘strangers’ 
to the British is endorsed: an East End schoolteacher from British Guiana in Stranger at the 
Blackboard; Indian communities in Ulster in Strangers in Our Midst; Midlands schoolchildren 
in Generation of Strangers.394 The last of these, broadcast in 1965, described of these 
‘strangers’ the ‘hard choice between white friends and white values that may in the end reject 
or betray him, and the safety of the culture he was born to’; ‘a search for identity.’395 Such a, 
literally, black and white dichotomy supports Philippa Levine’s assertion that assimilation ‘was 
very much a one-way street’. The umbrella of Britishness did not extend to its colonies, 
however anglicised; there was no association or denomination, only ‘contamination’ and 
heterodoxy.396  
 
 Remaining in the Midlands, the overbearing presence of Enoch Powell in this period 
and his lack thereof in BBC programming must be addressed. The Conservative M.P. for 
Wolverhampton South West appears in 1960 as the speaker in an episode of a series on 
Central Government about the House of Lords.397 Later he would be attributed by Anthony 
Sampson to ‘that special class of politicians … who claim to represent the dark, secret heart 
of the nation’, upon becoming the born-again messiah of the anti-immigration camp that 
argued, giving Paul Gilroy the title of his opus, ‘There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack’.398 The 
‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in Birmingham, which prophesied an apocalypse for multi-racial 
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Britain, led the Establishment to ‘label Powell’s championing of national identity as Fascist’ – 
polling into the 1970s showed a majority agreed with his racialist position.399 While instances 
of outright racism were small in a sample of the 100,000 letters of support – versus just 800 
in opposition – received by Powell in reaction to his sacking by Edward Heath from the 
Conservative Shadow Cabinet, ‘foreign or black or coloured invasion are freely used’.400 While 
it was thought false to overstate the force of avowed racialist groups, such as the out-and-out 
Nazi ‘Greater Britain Movement’, sympathy for their cause was proven in electoral returns that 
led to predictions that the ‘Union Movement may grow and the [British National Party] will 
almost certainly grow.’401 The sociologist Ruth Glass had questioned the news narrative after 
the race riots of Notting Hill and Nottingham, honing attention as it did on a popularly 
scapegoated fifth column of ‘Teddy Boys’, by recognising racism to be ‘latent in all social 
strata’.402 The victory of Peter Griffiths as Conservative M.P. for Smethwick in 1964, who 
refused to condemn the unofficial slogan of his campaign – ‘if you want a nigger for a 
neighbour, vote Liberal or Labour’ – proved a deeper rot of racism in society; statements like 
‘Rhodesia is as Britain was … in its halcyon days’, made by Tory backbencher Harold Soref 
after the colony’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, proved Powell’s extremism 
was not anomalous.403 
 
 Again, as with the The Colonial Reckoning, it is a Reith Lecture – rebroadcast on the 
World Service rather than produced for its audience – that takes near sole responsibility for 
airing the uncomfortable, off-brand truths of Britain and Britishness. However, Robert K. A. 
Gardiner’s disquisition on A World of Peoples in 1965, in his capacity as an Oxford social 
anthropologist and Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
– and a Ghanaian – fit the model instead of breaking the mould.404 Careful scrutiny was 
compromised to such abstract studies as The Science of Race, asking how the social and 
natural sciences could assuage ‘violent passions’ in the ‘present-day world’; almost express 
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emphasis on The Negro in America’s struggle for civil rights made concessions for the British 
record.405 Gardiner’s lectures similarly withdraw into concept and wider context. When his eye 
passes over Britain from a distance, it is ‘the centre of an inter-racial Commonwealth … which 
until recently could boast of freedom from prejudice.’ Such a boast appears to confine the 
scientific and vulgar racism of imperialism in situ, disconnected from the mainland – which 
gets merest mention – and its evolution into mainstream ethnocultural biases.406 Smethwick, 
which Gardiner does refer to directly, is warning that a ‘lunatic fringe’ can ‘make an impression 
on innocent minds’ – not prey on preconceptions. Studies of attitudes are necessary so that 
Britain can recognise its ‘involvement in a world-wide problem’ – actual findings of which are 
never cited. Britons are said to react to other races with ‘curiosity and wonderment at obvious 
differences; pleasure in the exotic; indifference; resentment and occasional hostility; a proper, 
but cold, formality; acceptance and genuine friendliness.’ There is no sense that a consensus 
exists on closing their door, and border, to ‘strangers’, only that immigration is a live issue on 
which it is Britain’s sovereign right to decide – it is not an issue of citizenship, as Kathleen Paul 
relates. On balance, excusing characteristic frigidity and inevitable friction, the British fare well 
by global comparison and benefit from Gardiner’s gaze on America, Rhodesia and South 
Africa.407 
 
Common Market and continentalism, war and exceptionalism 
 
A potential clash of identity and interest could also be foreseen with regard to Europe, our final 
theme. While in the sixties, civil servants and policymakers came around to ‘the idea that 
Britain did not simply have vital interests in Europe but was an integral part of Europe’, with 
no Government in power ever questioning The Grand Design of Macmillan until the departure 
of Brexit, it was and has ever since been very ‘publicly controversial’.408 In recognition of the 
magnitude of the first British application to joining to the E.E.C., discussion of Britain and the 
Common Market is given ample coverage – without ignoring the widespread view of 
‘collapsing’ rather than acceding into Europe. Early programmes explore, through such critics 
of British stagnation as Michael Shanks, ‘the existence of a European spirit’, even while 
juxtaposing ‘Europa and John Bull’, and ‘the relevance of Catholic and Protestant traditions in 
a technical age’.409 Conspiracy theories about a ‘Black International’ remained rife, suggesting 
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centuries old suspicions persisted, hence Macmillan’s first ever visit of a U.K. Prime Minister 
to the Vatican.410 A definition is sought for The Meaning of Europe in a programme of 1962, 
where ‘a deeper foundation’ based on ‘shared values which arise out of a common inheritance’ 
is said to be argued by many in favour of a natural unity – ‘a European personality’.411 Europe 
and Europeanness is presented as an open – if leading – question, without ever counterposing 
the two sides; framed in such a way that the debate tends toward the positive, however 
unpopular. With negotiations ongoing, British Writing Today asked readers to consider 
whether a better title might be ‘”Writing in Europe Today”?’ After all, English does not belong 
to Britain and ‘we live on a small island only just detached from the continent of Europe.’412 An 
understanding of the contemporary conservatism of literature, fearful of femininity and 
contemptuous of ‘abroad’ – there was ‘a plot by foreigners’, said Al Alvarez, to destroy tradition 
through Frenchified modernists – leads one to predict that the set Larkin and Amis belonged 
to would have been characteristically acerbic but in no way contrarian.413 
 
 However, conversations around the Common Market peter out in programmes through 
the sixties, even while they did not in the domain of public debate; the World Service offered 
no coverage at all of the second application in 1967 or its aftermath.414 It is especially 
interesting to note that the edition of London Calling for the English-language European 
Service – it being closely similar to if separate from the World Service until 1969 – made no 
mention at all in the run up to either application, recusing itself of any programming 
whatsoever. The stated reasons for the services in English being merged were technical; 
speculatively, it could also suggest that Europe was no longer deemed to warrant its former 
special treatment, not that its programming had substantially or substantively differed, or that 
keeping apart the two services supported the accusations of French President Charles de 
Gaulle that Britain was itself of two minds. Instead, there is one service for all regardless of 
region, and without special regard to the British world. But where there is coverage of the 
Common Market between 1961-1963, the BBC were clearly of the mind – along with a majority 
of British politicians and people – that the ‘vital concern’ of the Commonwealth must be the 
 
410 The ‘Black International’ was a secret organisation linked to Rome which brought together the 
leaders of the Catholic committees in nine European countries to stem the tide of liberalism, socialism 
and nationalism that threatened the Church at the end of the 19th century. Weight, Patriots, p.335. 
411 London Calling, Vol.2, No.291 (27 December 1962) p.1. 
412 London Calling, Vol.2, No.251 (22 March 1962) p.1. 
413 Sandbrook, Never Had It So Good, pp.172-76. 
414 With the addendum, again, that London Calling sheds no light on items in news and current affairs 
programmes, the only proof that the Common Market featured is in the form of a listener’s letter: 
‘“Dear Sir, One often hears that Britain is negotiating to enter the Common Market, but when the Six 
next meet France vetoes Britain’s entry on the matter of agricultural prices and products. Does this 
mean that Britain’s survival depends on joining the Common Market?” Questions like this one, from a 
listener in Ghana, provide talking-points for the programme Letters from the World…’.  
London Calling, Vol.3, No.44 (November 1966) p.4. 
82 
 
focal point. The decision could lead to a world where ‘Britain abandoned her old traditional 
position by going into Europe’ and is not made lightly; listings talk up British efforts to 
‘safeguard’ and ‘represent to her nearest neighbours the far-reaching implications of 
Commonwealth unity.’415 The phrase ‘going into Europe’, alluding to the idea that Britain was 
somehow based elsewhere, is consistently employed.416  
 
 Somewhat surprisingly, data from polling on attitudes to Europe showed that 63 per 
cent did, at least, think Britain to be a European country. Although arguably a simple matter of 
fact rather than opinion, there was wide if not wholehearted acceptance. When questioned on 
identity rather than geography, however, less than half believed Britain could ever be ‘wholly 
European’. Britons tended to view the Soviet Union more favourably than their actual allies in 
Western Europe, with whom they wished to trade more freely but imposed a heavy tariff in 
terms of trust – a cynicism and suspicion that was endemic, with only the Australians 
seemingly absolved, but nevertheless extreme in the case of Germany and France.417 By 
focusing on the political and economic case and ramifications of E.E.C. membership, BBC 
programming could be defended for having properly represented the unsentimental 
attachment Britons could at best be said to have. ‘As momentous a step as any government 
has ever had to take’ – ‘had’ being the operative word – the portrayal of inevitability based on 
practicality chimes with the 76 per cent who effectively saw British entry as an irresistible 
conclusion.418 But roughly the same proportion, not always as overwhelming yet rarely 
reversed, remained unpersuaded if not positively opposed.419 Looking to the future from 1969, 
only nine per cent thought that joining the Common Market ought to be among the top four 
objectives for Britain in the next decade, compared with almost double (16 per cent) that 
prioritising for building more motorways.420 In the final analysis, coverage of the Common 
Market by the General Overseas Service is cursory, confined to its challenge to the 
Commonwealth rather than Britishness; the World Service excuses itself from commentary 
and the implications of Europhobe identity altogether. Programming prefers to talk up such 
pan-European endeavours as Concorde, ‘the cornerstone of collaboration between Great 
Britain and the rest of Europe’, without ever giving any impression of the ill-feeling inflicted by 
the French rebuttals of 1963 and 1967 – or the unease generally felt at the prospect of 
association to start with.421 
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 As explored in chapter three, the experience of war in Europe – in particular though 
not only 1939-1945 – was foundational to British identity. While reservations about Britain’s 
European partners and resistance to any deeper partnership with them show that emotions 
had not softened, if perhaps losing their edge, an incremental editing out of the Second World 
War from broadcast schedules is revealing. The twentieth anniversary of the Battle of Britain 
in 1960 is marked with a myriad different programme strands. Covering the occasion are 
selections of music about the Allied airmen – The Lion Had Wings – dramatic portrayals of 
figures ‘in whom the heroic qualities of “the Few” could not have been more clearly personified’ 
– With Courage – and interviews with civilians and ex-servicemen involved in the defence of 
the British Isles from Nazi invasion.422 A Scrapbook for 1940 recounted how ‘the fighter pilots 
of the R.A.F. had destroyed Hitler’s aerial armada’ in what was Their Finest Hour; the 
biographical account of one airman saved by plastic surgery to fly again exemplified ‘the 
quality of which Britain’s 1940 pilots - the few - were made.’423 On the ground, schedules in 
the early sixties are punctuated with references to the Blitz – Allied strategic bombing and the 
devastation of Dresden go without remark. When cities such as Plymouth and Hull are the 
subjects of programmes, the listener is prompted to recall ‘the heavy and persistent Nazi air-
raids’ when taking in their audio tour; one cannot forget the ‘saturation bombing by enemy 
raiders’ that led to the ‘coventration’ coined of the Midlands city, with frequent visits to its 
cathedral.424 Exacerbated by such destruction, ‘the Continent was perceived as a thoroughly 
alien place, at best troublesome and at worst hostile.’425 War remained for sixties Britons ‘one 
of the central experiences of their lives’, reinforced by a ‘cenotaph culture’ in films and books, 
monuments and exhibitions. It was in large part for this reason that a complacent feeling of 
exceptionalism was sustained; that association with ‘continentals … a bombed out, defeated 
rabble’ remained ‘unthinkable.’426 
 
 By the coming of the World Service in 1965, it is testament to detachment concerning 
the ‘modern national myth’, always at some variance from local legend by its inclusion of 
‘Sikhs, Punjabis, Gurkhas, Baluchs and Rajputs’, that the death of Winston Churchill is not 
cause for chauvinism or Commonwealth reaffirmation.427 Rather than solely paying tribute to 
Churchill as the ‘great defender’ of the English-speaking world, an article by Tangye Lean 
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draws on letters received ‘from ordinary listeners in sixty countries’ that demonstrate ‘it was 
the world which recognized him as its hero.’ His legacy is even tempered by recognition of his 
opposition to the independence of Indian and Pakistani well-wishers. More striking still, 
through letters ‘in great numbers’ from Germans, Italians, French and Czechs, as well as 
Japanese, that legacy is made universal – even continental.428 When the 50th anniversary of 
‘The Great War’ arrived in 1964, the participation of the Empire is remembered in a special 
programme for having ‘paved the way for the ultimate independence within the 
Commonwealth that others enjoy today.’ But it is the promotion of the ‘biggest television 
documentary ever’, promised to be distributed around the world, that takes centre place in 
London Calling. In it, the producer relates, ‘There are no all-villains or all-heroes. Our aim has 
been to show what the Great War was really like, on all fronts and in all countries. We do not 
pass judgment or comment. The Great War series has no “enemy”.’429 When the time comes 
to mark the 30th anniversary of The War That Changed the World, the same non-partisan 
attempt at telling its collective history is made through sixteen episodes on and from every 
front. The service and sacrifice of Britain and its Commonwealth receive no supplementary 
treatment, contained within a single narrative of a series with an eye on Europe in explaining 
the war’s ‘relevance to the political scene of 1969.’ 430 
 
 Whether intended for the benefit of a Commonwealth audience whose ties were 
sustained through remembrance of shared struggle, or simply reflecting the continued 
influence of war on British identity, an initial preoccupation with the fight against Fascism 
figures less and less as the sixties progress. Pre-World Service, wartime records are regularly 
proclaimed of the contributors listed in London Calling, and as late as 1967 can still crop up 
on occasion. But as an example, the announcement of Charles Curran as the new Director of 
External Broadcasting in February 1967 includes the fact of his service in the Indian Army, 
whereas this is omitted from a biography for him when readers are told of his elevation to 
Director-General in November 1968.431 A convention for introducing a man by his rank and 
role in wartime is gradually broken; the war itself moves from living, walking memory to 
something that documentarians sift through archives to recollect. Meanwhile, a change as 
symbolic as that of the renaming of the World Service occurred within the BBC’s Henry Wood 
Promenade Concerts (colloquially the Proms), its bills featuring foreign artists for the first time 
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as of 1964. This flag-waving festival of Britishness could now, London Calling declared, offer 
listeners the finest European talents.432 Where once British and Commonwealth artistry were 
pointedly central to BBC schedules, Let the Peoples Sing was a sign of increasing receptivity 
to and engagement with Europe, in a similar vein to the Eurovision Song Contest. A choir 
competition, the programme promised such face-offs in its tournament as Germany versus 
Switzerland, Norway versus Denmark, and Belgium versus Yugoslavia.433 Britain through the 
BBC becomes an entrepot for cultural exchange, inviting in its non-British neighbours  
 
 Changing World Patterns in 1967 proved a shift underway in the BBC’s own status 
quo, the listing standing out for its inclusion of speakers not attributable to the English-
speaking world:  Richard Loewenthal, Professor of International Relations at Free University 
in Berlin, on ‘World Politics’; Raymond Aron, Professor of Sociology at Paris University, on 
‘The Economic Organization of the Future.’434 In the following year, a series of programmes 
on The Newspapers of the World did not mislead, lacking the space to be truly all-
encompassing but nevertheless casting a wider net than the former and informal Empire. 
Along with Vadim Nekrasov, Deputy Chief Editor of Russian Pravda, the Foreign Editor of 
French Le Monde, André Fontaine, speaks on the ‘enormous influence for good or evil’ 
permeating from the presses of ‘the world’s best-known newspapers.’435 Far more pronounced 
Europeanisation of World Service output is demonstrable in its dramatic repertoire. In the first 
half of the decade, Head of Sound Drama Val Gielgud described as ‘Utopia’ the task of 
representing ‘the whole theatrical scene’; all the writers showcased as having been exposed 
through BBC patronage are British.436 Gielgud’s successor, Martin Esslin, boasts upon his 
promotion in London Calling that his department’s investment ‘is no mean public service in the 
laborious task of opening windows on the outside world’, drawing attention to the decisive 
success of Jean Anouilh and Ugo Betti after BBC debut. The ‘little known’ fact that Eugène 
Ionesco’s Rhinoceros had its premiere on the Third Programme prior to performance in Paris 
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 While the occasional translation of a European play provides the exception that proves 
the rule pre-1965, that year brings an ‘International Drama Season’ and a regular ‘World 
Theatre’ section of the listings where continental playwrights stake increasing claim.438 And by 
the time one looks through the pages of London Calling in 1968 and 1969, programming is 
suffused with Scandinavian, Swiss, Ukrainian, French, German, Austrian, Italian, Dutch, 
Spanish, Czech, as well as Russian names. A window that was at best left ajar is indeed 
swung open with stagings of scripts by Federico Garcia Lorca and the brothers Serafín and 
Joaquín Álvarez Quintero, Jean Giraudoux and Molière, Gerhart Hauptmann and Bertolt 
Brecht.439 As companion to this surge of interest in European theatre, the World Service 
listener of 1969 is actually accompanied through programmes across the Channel. The Vienna 
State Opera was explored in a visit to its ‘great opera house’, at which one can hear ‘the 
English tenor Piccaver as well as many of today’s stars.’440 The Folies Bergère was the 
destination of another programme, gathering the reminiscences of several French 
‘personalities of the great show world of Paris’ in order to tell its history.441 The Music of Finland 
is broadcast on the occasion of the state visit of President Kekkonen, a welcome last 
warranted of a non-Commonwealth dignitary in 1960 – a concert celebrating the L’Entente 
Cordiale greeting Charles de Gaulle.442 Tapping or stepping along to the tunes of European 
National Dances – ‘Dowland’s pavanes, Dvorak’s Slavonic dances and Brahms’ Hungarian, 
Strauss’ waltzes, Smetana’s polkas and Skalkotta’s Greek dances’ – listeners could not 
reasonably consider that the joining of the BBC’s English-language services had entailed a 
subordination, worse still elimination of Europe from broadcasts.443 Concurrent to the removal, 
cut by cut, of the Commonwealth from programme output, a process of Europeanisation was 
completed in which a bitter past – living and breathing still – was buried. 
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It seems absurd to suggest that England is a comfortable place … Countries 
in this century have become provinces, and if provincial life is always difficult 
and stifling for some, it is especially tough when you live in a demoted capital. 
Like Alice, we have taken the mixture and grown smaller… We shouldn’t 
pretend to like this, and we shouldn’t pretend that only colonels care about 
losing our empire and being a second-class power (second-class?). We all 
care. And the frantic and strident business of how swinging we were, which 
seemed so important two or three years ago, was only an attempt to hang on, 
to suggest that we weren’t the provinces really, because we were still the 
capital of something. We don’t believe that any more, I think. The scepticism 
with which the backing of Britain was received, the lack of jingoism in response 
to the British heart transplant (in spite of encouragement from flag-waving 
surgeons), were signs of a more relaxed sense of our national identity, of a 
start in coming to terms with our new, small status… The reverse side of what 
seems to me a relaxation of our worries is the anguish of Enoch Powell’s 
supporters about our vanishing way of life, which can be ruined, apparently, by 
a lot of people wearing saris and eating rice. What this means, of course, is 
that Powell’s fans don’t know what our way of life is, although they need to, 
and this is their worry. They feel their identity escaping them. But they don’t 
have to look that far to find it again. They might find it, for example, in behaving 
sanely and decently when voices like Mr Powell’s prompt them to do 
otherwise.444 
 
In this mournful meditation on Britishness of 1968, critic and cultural historian Michael Wood 
summarised the driving themes of both our period and the BBC programmes broadcast during 
it. The sense of confusion and dejection, conflict and desperation is vivid and, as we have 
explored, unsensational in its perception. Britain existed within a globalised world of 
‘provinces’, which it was a part of rather than apart from. Without an imperial monopoly on 
resources and trade, Stephen Tallents had campaigned for the projection of the nation to 
preserve – in some cases repair – its influence. This did not differ substantively from nation 
branding, designed to create and inculcate an identity that would through its personality give 
its ‘client’ the persuasive power to compete in a decentralised, market system, developing 
channels of publicity that enable the nation to control its image. Any nation ‘must present what 
makes it so distinctive’, employing the ‘cunning of recognition’ – as Elizabeth Povinelli calls it 
– to sell itself to the ‘various interlocutors’ of the global marketplace; diversity becomes a 
‘currency’ traded upon, says George Yúdice, internal difference acknowledged ‘only insofar 
as it corresponds to patterns of consumption.’445 The individuality and division inherent of all 
identity, ‘imagined’ and interpreted by those ‘belonging’ to it, distracts and, indeed, damages 
the brand by which a nation sells itself. As this dissertation has explored through its catalogue 
of programmes, there were patterns and preferences to representations of Britishness that, 
 
444 Michael Wood, ‘This England’, New Society (5 September 1968) pp.342-43. 
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while it could never be expected to reflect the nation in its entirety or variety, prove a brief. 
Identity was curated, compiled into a ‘montage’, that together and through its core themes was 
directly supportive of national interests. ‘Touting for custom’ involved more than merely 
providing a brochure for Britain and its business; all content advertised certain ‘aspects of 
identity’ that acted to market the nation itself, its vigour and verve and values. 
 
 If we take Michael Wood’s critique as reference, the BBC certainly promoted the 
absurdity of Britain as a ‘comfortable place’. It was not a ‘demoted capital’ frantically trying to 
count for ‘something’, but the centre of a civilisation that had served as an archetype and 
continued through science and culture to forge the future. If the ‘backing of Britain’ – the We’re 
Backing Britain phenomenon – was in fact lackluster, that is not the impression the listener of 
the World Service gets from its parade of pop icons and youthful innovators, collectively 
fighting for British prestige as if it were their form of national service. While Britain had ‘grown 
smaller’ it had not forfeited its status as a great power; its part in world politics was greater 
than ever, as the grown-up in the room between the precariously opposed, pubescent rivals 
of East and West. Britain was presented as a leader of the global community, humanitarianism 
and internationalism played up as hallmarks of the British. If the success of a breakthrough 
cardiovascular procedure was not occasion for patriotism, then the routine ‘flag-waving’ of the 
BBC in programmes on astronomical, atomic, automotive and aeronautic achievements gives 
the sense not of a ‘coming to terms’ but an assuredness of self and purpose. If the support for 
Enoch Powell suggested his concern for the extinction of cherished traditions – even of the 
British as a people – by immigration was commonplace, then the BBC’s celebration of a 
cosmopolitan Commonwealth was at odds with such xenophobic cultural protectionism. In a 
similar vein, the exception taken to and exceptionalism felt about Europe is nowhere to be 
seen; what was instead heard were the translated plays of European writers, performances of 
its musicians, sounds of its cities, accents of its academics.  
 
 Hugh Carleton Greene was right in asserting to the Foreign Press Association, as 
reprinted in London Calling, the BBC’s commitment to provide an ‘accurate and acceptable 
picture of Britain’ – acceptability implied there was still a certain economy with the truth, which 
this paper concludes served economic, and other, interests.446 A nation brand must trade on 
facts, but there is a flexibility and selectivity in its construction of them. BBC programmes 
undoubtedly selected their themes and were flexible in the treatment of them. In place of the 
loaded language of propaganda, this propagation of certain ideas of an ideal Britishness, 
never ignorant of racism or other social ills but inclined almost wholly toward the praiseworthy, 
 
446 BBC, London Calling, Vol.3, No.12, Mar 1964, pp.6-7. 
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is better and far less debatably understood as branding. It seizes and substantiates a narrative 
in which the British legacy is civilisation not colonisation, its Commonwealth the mission of the 
masses. When the Common Market became the target consumer, identity changed to suit 
those ‘patterns of consumption’ – the British are receptive of European culture, with 
collaboration on Concorde taking the place in schedules of previously promoted projects in 
cooperation with former subjects. Conversations on Britishness were steered to follow a path 
that runs parallel with Britain’s geopolitical pivot in the sixties. With the change from General 
Overseas to World Service marking the midway point of this decade-long shift, we find a new 
chapter in the story of Britishness as told by the BBC, its canon revised to evangelise to a 
world beyond the choir it had previously preached to. Much of the brand remained the same, 
its unique selling points still core to the pitch, but with a changing market we see this branding 
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